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Table 2.1:  Experimental Effects of Instruction Studies                                                                                                                                 
Study Type (classroom or Contrast Results Measure of Learner-
laboratory; natural or Internal Processes?
                                     artificial language)                                                                                                      (learner awareness,  behavior)           
Doughty (1991) laboratory; natural meaning-focused vs. improvement in no
language (English) form-focused vs. relativization by both
exposure only on instruction groups;
acquisition of relative improved compre-
clauses hension by meaning
group
Kepner (1991) classroom; natural message-related vs. improved surface no
language (Spanish) corrective feedback accuracy and ideational
on learners' writing quality only for learners
receiving message-
related feedback
Mondria & Wit-de classroom; natural inference-conducive improved inference no
Boer (1991) language (French) context vs. lack of but not retention in
such context on inference-conducive
vocabulary acquisition context
Rose Chang & Smith classroom; natural individual learning vs. no effect on overall yes (audio recordings
(1991) language (Spanish) cooperative learning achievement of dyads showing how
on learners' achievement they approached the task;
nothing for monads)
White (1991) classroom; natural explicit (including short-term improvement no
language (English); negative feedback) vs. with explicit instruction,
children positive evidence alone effects not lasting
on adverb placement
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Table 2.1 (continued):  Experimental Effects of Instruction Studies                                                                                                             
Study Type (classroom or Contrast Results Measure of Learner-
laboratory; natural or Internal Processes?
                                     artificial language)                                                                                                      (learner awareness,  behavior)           
White, et. al (1991) classroom; natural explicit instruction improvement with ex- no
language (English); + feedback vs. plicit instruction,
children positive evidence still maintained after
without instruction on five weeks
question formation
Carroll & Swain laboratory; natural explicit vs. implicit improvement for all no
(1993) language (English) corrective feedback feedback groups,
vs. no feedback on especially for explicit
acquisition of dative feedback
alternation
DeKeyser (1993) classroom; natural explicit corrective no overall effect; no (however, ques-
language (French) feedback vs. no error correction tionnaire used to assess
corrective feedback beneficial for learners extrinsic motivation and
during oral production with high previous anxiety)
on proficiency achievement, low
anxiety, and low ex-
trinsic motivation
N. Ellis (1993) laboratory; natural exposure to rules vs. limited learning with no
language (Welsh) instances vs. rules + instances; better learn-
instances on with rules; best learn-
acquisition of with rules and instances
orthographic rules
Fotos (1993) classroom; natural effect of grammar grammar lesson and yes (instruction
language (English) lesson vs. grammar grammar task result to underline "special
task vs. communica- in more noticing use of English" in
tive task on noticing texts to assess noticing)
29
Table 2.1 (continued):  Experimental Effects of Instruction Studies                                                                                                             
Study Type (classroom or Contrast Results Measure of Learner-
laboratory; natural or Internal Processes?
                                     artificial language)                                                                                                      (learner awareness,  behavior)           
VanPatten & Cadiernoclassroom; natural explicit vs. input- improved production no
(1993) language (Spanish) processing instruction with explicit instruction;
on acquisition of clitic improved production and
direct object pronouns comprehension with
input-processing
instruction
R. Ellis, et. al (1994) classroom; natural premodified vs. modified input pro- no
language (English) interactionally-modified acquisition; inter-
vs. unmodified input actionally-modified
on vocabulary better than premodified
acquisition
Fotos (1994) classroom; natural grammar conscious- improved accuracy with no
language (English) ness raising tasks vs. grammar tasks compar-
communicative tasks able with teacher-
and vs. teacher-fronted fronted instruction;
instruction on word quantity of interaction
order with grammar tasks
comparable with
communicative tasks
Master (1994) classroom; natural 10-week systematic improvement on article use no
language (English) instruction vs. no instruc- for learners receiving
tion on acquisition of instruction; no improvement
articles without instruction
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Table 2.1 (continued):  Experimental Effects of Instruction Studies                                                                                                             
Study Type (classroom or Contrast Results Measure of Learner-
laboratory; natural or Internal Processes?
                                     artificial language)                                                                                                      (learner awareness,  behavior)           
Alanen (1995) laboratory; semi- rules vs. enhancement treatments facilitated yes (think aloud proto-
artificial (Finnish- vs. rules + enhancement noticing and cols; questionnaire asking
based) vs. exposure only on acquisition for rule statements and
acquisition of locative learners' perception of
suffixes and consonant enhancement)
alternation
Cadierno (1995) classroom; natural processing instruction improved production no
language (Spanish) vs. traditional instruc- with traditional instruction;
tion vs. no instruction improved production and
on acquisition of past comprehension with input-
tense verb morphology processing instruction
DeKeyser (1995) laboratory; artificial explicit-deductive vs. categorical rules learned yes (retrospective
language implicit-inductive better with explicit interview investigating
instruction on acquisi- instruction; prototypical how learners approached
tion of categorical and rules learned better with the task)
prototypical morpho- implicit instruction
logical rules
R. Ellis (1995) classroom; natural premodified input vs. acquisition with both yes (uptake charts asking
language (English) interactionally- types of input, but better only learners receiving inter-
modified input on for interacionally- actionally modified input
vocabulary acquisition modified input about new vocabulary)
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Table 2.1 (continued):  Experimental Effects of Instruction Studies                                                                                                             
Study Type (classroom or Contrast Results Measure of Learner-
laboratory; natural or Internal Processes?
                                     artificial language)                                                                                                      (learner awareness,  behavior)           
Hulstijn, et. al (1996) laboratory; natural marginal gloss vs. greater retention with yes (word recognition test
language (French) dictionary use vs. no gloss and dictionary (at to assess whether learners
additional information least when consulted), were aware of words that
and single vs. multiple especially for multiple- had appeared in the story;
occurrence in incidental occurrence vocabulary indication by dictionary
vocabulary acquisition users of looked-up words)
Robinson (1995,1996a,laboratory; natural implicit vs. incidental superior performance by yes (retrospective
1996b, 1997a) language (English) vs. rule-search vs. learners in instructed interview investigating
instructed conditions condition how learners had approached
on easy and hard rules the task; rule verbalization)
Trahey (1996) classroom; natural input flood vs. input flood more effective no
language (English); explicit instruction for long-term retention;
children and no instruction on however, ungrammatical
adverb placement* placement still accepted
Winitz (1996) classroom; natural implicit instruction vs. more accurate judgements no
language (Spanish) explicit instruction on with implicit instruction
grammaticality
judgements
de Graaff (1997) laboratory; artificial explicit vs. implicit explicit instruction no (results of debriefing
language (Spanish- instruction on morpho- facilitates acquisition interview not mentioned)
based) syntax
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Table 2.1 (continued):  Experimental Effects of Instruction Studies                                                                                                             
Study Type (classroom or Contrast Results Measure of Learner-
laboratory; natural or Internal Processes?
                                     artificial language)                                                                                                      (learner awareness,  behavior)           
DeKeyser (1997) laboratory; artificial production practice production practice yes (metalinguistic test to
language vs. comprehension facilitates production; determine whether
practice (both following comprehension prac- criterion level had been
explicit instruction) tice facilitates reached)
on morphosyntax comprehension
Robinson (1997b) laboratory; semi- implicit vs. incidental superior performance in yes (retrospective
artificial (English- vs. enhanced vs. enhanced and instructed interview investigating
based) instructed conditions conditions how learners approached
on argument structure the task; rule verbalization)
of novel verbs
Tinkham (1997) laboratory; artificial semantic-clustering superiority of thematic- yes (debriefing interview
vocabulary vs. thematic-clustering clustering asking for learners' per-
on vocabulary ception of ease and
 acquisition difficulty of learning)
Yang & Givon (1997) laboratory; artificial grammatical input vs. pidgin input does not no (however questionnaire
language simplified pidgin input facilitate vocabulary used to assess learners'
on acquisition of voca- acquisition, but hinders motivation)
bulary and grammar grammar acquisition
Zimmerman, C. M. classroom; natural self-selected reading beneficial effects for yes (pre and post
(1997) language (English) with interactive interactive vocabulary questionnaires used to
vocabulary instruction instruction assess learners percep-
vs. without on tions of vocabulary
vocabulary acquisition learning strategies)
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Table 2.1 (continued):  Experimental Effects of Instruction Studies                                                                                                             
Study Type (classroom or Contrast Results Measure of Learner-
laboratory; natural or Internal Processes?
                                     artificial language)                                                                                                      (learner awareness,  behavior)           
Izumi & Lakshmanan classroom (specially- provision of negative improvement with pro- no
(1998) created for the research);evidence vs. no vision of negative
natural language negative evidence on evidence
(English) acquisition of passive
Joe (1998) classroom (specially- explicit training to generation facilitates yes (self-reports indi-
created for the research);generate recently acquisition; training cating learners' familiarity
natural language encountered voca- does not result in more with vocabulary)
(English) bulary during retelling generation
vs. no training on
vocabulary acquisition
Leow (1998) classroom; natural learner-centered vs. benefits for learner- yes (think-aloud proto-
language (Spanish) teacher-centered centered and multiple cols to assess noticing
exposure and single exposure and activation of prior
vs. multiple exposure knowledge)
acquisition of stem-
changing verbs
Long, et. al (1998) laboratory; natural preemptive positive some evidence that no
languages (Japanese input (models) vs. adults can learn from
& Spanish) implicit negative feed- recasts and that recasts
back (recasts) on acqui- are more effective
sition of (untrue) word
order (Japanese) and
fronting of direct objects
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
*The explicit instruction and no instruction groups are from White (1991).
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Under the heading of Type, the table lists information on whether the study was
conducted in a laboratory or a classroom and whether it involved a natural or artificial
language.  Laboratory studies allow for a greater degree of control than do classroom
studies, but may also be less generalizable to classroom contexts.  The same is true for
artificial versus natural languages.  The table also indicates the instruction contrast that
the study investigated.  Only experimental studies which contrasted two or more kinds of
instruction are included in this table.  The basic results are given next.  The original
studies should be consulted for more detailed information about the contrast and results.
Finally, under the heading of Measure of Learner-Internal Processes, information is
given about whether there was an attempt in the study to measure learner awareness,
noticing, or behavior.  An example of an assessment of learner behavior is DeKeyser
(1995), in which learners were interviewed to see to what extent they followed task
directions.
As Table 2.1 shows, researchers have taken a variety of approaches in studying
the effects of instruction.  Of the 32 studies, 13 have taken place in laboratories and
nineteen in classrooms, with one trend being a shift toward laboratories as the decade
progresses.  Twenty-five of the studies have used natural languages, with 14 studies using
English, and seven studies have used artificial languages.  Here also, there is a second
trend, a shift toward the use of artificial languages as the decade progresses.  Researchers
have tended to investigate the effects of different kinds of instruction on morphosyntax,
but writing, orthography, and vocabulary acquisition have also been investigated.  Results
are mixed, but tend to indicate beneficial effects for some form of instruction which
focuses on both form and meaning (that is, focus on form, Doughty & Williams, 1998).
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Some of these studies are well-designed and very informative about the effects of
different kinds of instruction (e.g., Doughty, 1991; VanPatten & Cadierno, 1993;
Cadierno, 1995; Winitz, 1996; Long et al., 1998), but because they do not include any
measures of learner awareness or learner behavior in response to the instruction, they do
not illuminate any learner-internal processes.  These studies are critiqued in this section
in order to illustrate the questions that they leave open about learner awareness and
behavior.  This is, of course, rather unfair to these researchers since they were not
actually trying to investigate these learner-internal processes.  However, it is done
anyway in order to speculate on what these studies may have revealed had awareness and
behavior been investigated.
A third trend that can be seen in the table, the trend which is most relevant to this
paper, is a growing number of studies, as the decade progresses, that do investigate
learner-internal processes.  Some of these studies are also critiqued for how well they
illuminate the role of learner-internal processes in SLA.
No measure of learner-internal processes  Doughty (1991) conducted a tightly
controlled study of the learning of English relativization by learners receiving three
different types of computerized instruction.  A meaning-oriented group not only viewed
sentences containing object of a preposition relative clauses but was also given
information to help them understand the meaning of the sentences and presented with
highlighting and capitalization features to draw their attention to structure.  A rule-
oriented group was presented with explicit rules and computer animation which
deconstructed and reconstructed object of a preposition relative clauses so that learners
could see how they are formed.  A control group was merely exposed to the sentences.
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Doughty found that both the meaning-oriented group and the rule-oriented group showed
more improvement that the control group on relativization ability, while only the
meaning-oriented group showed improvement in comprehension of sentences containing
relative clauses.
Doughty attributes the ability of the meaning-oriented group to improve not only
in comprehension but also on the formal features of relativization to the techniques
(highlighting and capitalization) used to make the features salient and draw learners
attention.  This is certainly a plausible explanation.  However, without some means of
discovering exactly what drew the learners’ attention or what the learners were aware of
having learned, it is impossible to know for sure how effective the techniques were in
focusing learners’ attention on form, or how aware of form learners were.  In addition,
Doughty found that learners in the meaning-oriented group and the rule-oriented group,
as a result of receiving instruction on object of a preposition relative clauses, also
improved on less-marked relative clauses, as well as, quite surprisingly, more-marked
relative clauses.  This seems to indicate that the learners learned more than they had
actually been taught, begging “the question of how this apparent advantage for SLA
occurs” (p. 464).  It would seem that investigating what learners actually become aware
of during the process of learning may illuminate the origins of this advantage.
VanPatten and Cadierno (1993) compared two groups of learners receiving
instruction on the use of clitic direct object pronouns in Spanish.  One group, a
traditional instruction group, was taught explicit rules on the formation of sentences with
clitic direct object pronouns and completed exercises focusing on the production of
sentences containing the pronouns.  The exercises themselves progressed from
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mechanical drills, to meaningful practice, to communicative practice.  The other group,
an input processing group, received explanations of how to interpret the meaning of
sentences containing clitic direct object pronouns and practiced responding to the content
of sentences containing the pronouns.  Both groups received some kind of explicit
instruction, but while the traditional instruction group received rules for and practiced
production, the input processing group received help in processing and interpretation.
Cadierno (1995) conducted a similar study on the acquisition of past tense verb
morphology in Spanish.
Interestingly, VanPatten and Cadierno (1993) and Cadierno (1995) found that
while learners in the traditional instruction group improved only in production, learners
in the input processing group improved in both production and comprehension.  They
attribute this to input processing instruction helping learners’ processing mechanisms
convert input to intake which could then be integrated into learners’ interlanguage
systems.  Traditional instruction, though, was claimed to result in learned linguistic
knowledge which could only be used to monitor output in production.  However, because
VanPatten and Cadierno did not attempt to discover what learners became aware of
during instruction, it is again impossible to know what they were focusing on during
instruction.  Were learners in the input processing group solely focusing on
comprehension, or were they also trying to figure out rules for producing sentences with
clitic direct object pronouns?  Were all learners in the traditional instruction group
focusing exclusively on producing formally accurate sentences, or were they also
directing their attention toward meaning?
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Of the studies listed in Table 2.0, Winitz (1996) is unusual in that it found
benefits for what the author terms implicit instruction rather than for explicit instruction.
In this study, participants were given a grammaticality judgement test during the last
week of their first semester of Spanish.  About half of these learners had been attending
grammar/translation (explicit instruction) type classes.  The others had been attending
classes utilizing the Total Physical Response method and visual aids (implicit
instruction).  It should be noted that both classes followed a syllabus which specified the
structures and vocabulary which were to be covered.  Winitz found that learners in the
implicit instruction classes outperformed learners receiving explicit instruction on the
grammaticality judgement test.
Even though Winitz is clear in stating at the beginning of his study that "the terms
explicit and implicit refer primarily to language instructional approaches" (p.32), in
drawing his conclusions he conflates explicit and implicit instruction with explicit and
implicit learning, assuming that learners receiving explicit instruction learned explicitly
and learners receiving implicit instruction learned implicitly.  It is then concluded that
implicit learning processes are superior to explicit learning processes in developing
learners' grammatical competence.  Exactly what learners in each instruction group were
attending to and becoming aware of during their language lessons is left unanswered.
One possibility is that the implicit instruction was more interesting and thus better able to
keep learners focused on the task of learning Spanish, and as a result that learners
receiving implicit instruction were noticing more than those receiving explicit instruction.
Perhaps the use of, for instance, uptake charts following each class session, on which
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learners write down what they think they have learned, could have helped illuminate what
and how much learners were actually becoming aware of.
Long et al. (1998), the most recent study listed in Table 2.0, is actually two
studies, one involving Japanese as a foreign language3 and the other Spanish as a foreign
language, of the effects of models and recasts on learners' acquisition of a particular
structure.  Since recasts are believed to be a useful way to focus on form (Doughty &
Williams, 1998), conducting this kind of empirical research on their efficacy is very
important.  The researchers found some evidence that adults can learn from recasts and
that recasts are more effective than preemptive models.  Unfortunately, though, the
evidence is not quite overwhelming.
In the Long et al. studies (1998), as in the other studies critiqued above, there is
no information of how the learners respond to recasts or of what they become aware of
when they receive recasts.  For example, it seems likely that some learners would
recognize recasts as corrections and try to learn from them, while other learners would
treat recasts as just some peculiar kind of backchannel.  Perhaps debriefing interviews
could have been used to assess how learners perceived recasts and what they became
aware of as a result of the recasts.  This could have shed some light on how recasts may
work and any relationship between recasts and awareness.  Additionally, had information
on how learners did or did not react to recasts been included, it may also have illuminated
how learners were perceiving recasts.
It should be noted again that the above studies were not designed to investigate
learner awareness or other learner-internal processes.  Each of these studies provides
useful information on the effects of different kinds of instruction and it is unfair to
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criticize them for not investigating awareness.  In the next subsection, studies which do
address learner-internal processes will be critiqued for how well they accomplish this.
Measuring learner-internal processes.  Eight of the studies listed in Table 2.1 are
on vocabulary acquisition.  Five of these include some measure of learner-internal
processes.  For example, in one study on the effects of premodified versus interactionally
modified input (R. Ellis, 1995), uptake charts were used to assess what vocabulary
learners in the interactionally modified input group were aware of learning.  For some
reason, these charts were not used for learners in the premodified input group.  In another
study (Hulstijn, et al., 1996), a word recognition test was used to assess whether learners
were aware of vocabulary that had appeared in the story used in instruction.  Such
measures indicate that awareness is important during incidental vocabulary acquisition.
None of the studies, though, attempt to measure vocabulary acquisition as a function of
learner awareness.
The majority of studies in Table 2.1 deal with the acquisition of morphosyntax
rather than vocabulary.  Of these, the earliest to include a measure of learner-internal
processes is Fotos (1993), in which noticing was measured by asking learners to
underline "special uses of English" (p. 390).  Two other studies (Alanen, 1995; Leow,
1998) used think-aloud protocols to measure noticing.  In Fotos (1993) and Alanen
(1995), it was found that form-focused instruction resulted in more noticing and more
acquisition.  In Leow (1998), it was found that learner-centered activities and multiple
exposure facilitated noticing.
It is important to know how well different kinds of instruction can facilitate
noticing, but in order to investigate the causal role of awareness n SLA, it is even more
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important to investigate acquisition as a function of learner awareness.  In the Alanen
study (1995), for example, it was found that learners who focused on target features
tended to acquire them.  In a different study from that cited above, Leow (1997)
compared learners displaying different levels of awareness, a direct test of the noticing
hypothesis.  This study is not included in Table 2.1 since it does not involve comparison
of different kinds of instruction.  Using think-alouds collected from elementary learners
of Spanish as a foreign language completing a crossword puzzle designed to draw their
attention to the spelling changes of stem-changing verbs, Leow distinguished three levels
of awareness:  lack of awareness, awareness unaccompanied by a rule, and awareness
with a rule.  Leow found these different levels even though all learners were performing
the same task, indicating that it cannot be assumed that all learners in a given instruction
group learn in the same way.  Leow then compared learners at these different levels on
post-crossword puzzle recognition and production tasks and found that greater awareness
during the task was predictive of more recognition and greater productive accuracy.
Finally, Robinson (1995a, 1996a, 1996b, 1997a) has compared the awareness of
learners in implicit, incidental, rule-search, and instructed conditions and has also
(Robinson, 1995a, 1997a) attempted to compare the quality of learning displayed by
learners with more or less awareness.  In order to assess learners’ awareness levels,
Robinson gave each learner a debriefing questionnaire immediately following completion
of computerized instruction.  Learners were asked whether they had been looking for
rules, whether they had noticed rules, and whether they were able to verbalize rules.
Learners who answered the last question positively were also asked to attempt this
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verbalization and were classified as able-to-verbalize if they could give a rule, rule
fragment, or relevant exemplar.
Robinson was able to make some interesting findings by looking at the awareness
of learners in different instruction conditions.  First it was found that some learners in all
four instruction groups, even the implicit and incidental groups, answered that they were
looking for rules, that they did notice rules, and that they were able to verbalize rules.  A
chi-square analysis comparing the frequencies of learners in different conditions who
answered these questions positively revealed that only at the level of looking for rules
was there a significantly greater number of learners in the rule-search and instructed
conditions.  Even so, over one third of learners in the implicit condition and over one half
of learners in the incidental condition stated that they had been looking for rules.  Also
interesting is that not all learners in the rule-search and instructed conditions answered
that they had noticed, had been looking for, or were able to verbalize rules.  In fact, over
one fifth of learners in the rule-search condition stated that they had not been looking for
rules, despite instructions to do so.  As in Leow (1997), this shows quite clearly that it
should not be assumed that learners necessarily learn as researchers intend them to.
Learners receiving implicit, incidental, or similar instruction may be intentionally trying
to learn, while learners receiving more explicit instruction may be failing to make use of
it.  Similar results were found in Robinson (1997b), which compared learners in implicit,
incidental, enhanced (rather than rule-search), and instructed conditions.
Robinson (1995a, 1997a) also compared the learning success of learners in each
condition who were aware at the levels of noticing, looking for rules, and able to
verbalize rules with those who were not.  Learners in four different instruction
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conditions, described above, had received instruction on or exposure to an easy
pedagogical rule and a hard pedagogical rule.  By comparing the success of learners who
reported awareness with those who did not, Robinson found that learners in the implicit
condition who reported that they had been looking for rules were significantly more
successful in learning both the easy and the hard rule than learners in the same condition
who had not been looking for rules.  The same was true for implicit learners who were
able to verbalize rules.  In addition, learners in the rule-search condition who were able to
verbalize rules were more successful on the hard rule than those who were not.  This
indicates not only that learners in supposedly implicit, unconscious learning conditions
may actually be attempting to learn intentionally, but also that those learners who do
attempt this may be more successful as a result of their higher level of awareness.
Importance of Learner-Internal Processes
The studies described above indicate that a) explicit instruction, learner
involvement, and multiple exposure facilitate noticing, b) learning occurs with
awareness, which, of course, results from noticing, and c) learner behavior is not
determined solely by the type of instruction they receive.  This last fact highlights the
importance of investigating learner-internal processes since, for example, learners who
receive some form of non-explicit instruction may nevertheless be trying to learn
explicitly while other learners receiving explicit instruction may not.  Learner behavior
will also influence what is noticed.  Evidence for this dissociation between type of
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instruction and learner behavior was found in the studies by Leow (1997) and Robinson
(1995a, 1996a, 1996b, 1997a, 1997b) discussed above.
Further evidence for this dissociation comes from DeKeyser (1995).  In an effort
to investigate implicit-inductive and explicit-deductive language learning in a tightly-
controlled atmosphere, DeKeyser conducted an experiment in which two groups of
learners received computerized instruction in the use of a miniature linguistic system.  By
using such a system, DeKeyser was able to control for prior learning (there could be
none) while simultaneously imitating natural language learning by using a system which
could, in a limited way, be used to communicate information.  While DeKeyser found a
benefit for explicit instruction for categorical rules, as opposed to prototypical patterns,
from the point of view of the present paper one of the most interesting elements of the
DeKeyser study was his use of retrospection.  Learners were asked, among other things,
whether they had been looking for grammar errors and how much they had been thinking
about grammar.  Learners also reported that they were able to understand most of the
language used in the experiment.  In addition, learners in the implicit-inductive group
“were asked whether they had suspected there was a system of grammar rules underlying
the sentences they had seen” (p. 396).  Seventeen out of the twenty-one learners in this
group said they had.  This is interesting because it illustrates the importance of not
assuming that learners will behave as researchers intend.  It is possible that learners
receiving implicit instruction will end up explicitly focusing on the targets.  As DeKeyser
points out, learning strategies can override distinctions drawn by researchers.
While DeKeyser (1995) found that learners receiving implicit instruction may
actually be trying to learn explicitly, DeKeyser (1997) is also sensitive to the fact that
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learners cannot be assumed to be aware merely as a result of having received explicit
instruction.  In this study, DeKeyser compared the comprehension and production
abilities of groups of learners who had extensively practiced either production or
comprehension after receiving explicit instruction on an artificial language.  It was found
that production practice led to improvement only in production and, in contrast to
VanPatten and Cadierno (1993) and Cadierno (1995), that comprehension practice led to
improvement only in comprehension.  Importantly, before beginning practice, learners
had to reach a criterion level of awareness on a metalinguistic test, thus controlling for
the fact that explicit instruction does not guarantee awareness.
Because type of instruction is dissociated from type of learning and does not
determine how learners will approach the task of learning a language, it is important for
researchers attempting to investigate different types of learning, such as explicit, implicit,
incidental, or intentional learning, not to assume that type of instruction determines what
learners do.  Also, in investigations of the role of awareness in SLA, it is important not to
equate explicit instruction with learner awareness or non-explicit instruction or exposure-
only with lack of awareness.
Measuring Learner Awareness
Several of the effects of instruction studies discussed above are admirable in that
they include some measure of learner awareness.  For studies of vocabulary acquisition,
such measurement seems relatively straightforward.  Researchers can easily make use of
uptake charts or word recognition tests.  Things are more complicated, though, when
researchers attempt to measure awareness of some kind of rule, as needs to be done in
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studies of the acquisition of morphosyntax.  Research on awareness and learning in the
field of cognitive psychology can be very instructive for researchers in the field of SLA
attempting to investigate awareness.  Three examples of such research will be discussed
here.
One example is Curran and Keele (1993), discussed in the previous chapter, in
which sequential learning under single-task and dual-task conditions by learners who had
and had not been informed of the sequence was compared.  Rather than assuming that
learners who had not been informed of the sequence were unaware, the researchers used
interviews to probe these learners’ awareness and then divided them into more-aware and
less-aware groups, recognizing the impossibility of categorically stating that less-aware
learners were completely unaware.  While the researchers' claims for non-attentional
learning are not very convincing, their use of a measure of awareness to discriminate
among more-aware and less-aware learners, who had received the same instruction, is
commendable and should be emulated in SLA.
A very different approach was taken in Clark and Squire (1998).  In this study, the
researchers compared delay conditioning and trace conditioning by normal participants
and participants with hippocampal lesions.  In delay conditioning, a conditioned stimulus
is presented slightly before the onset of an unconditioned stimulus and the two stimuli are
terminated simultaneously.  In trace conditioning, a conditioned stimulus is also
presented slightly before the unconditioned stimulus, but the conditioned stimulus is
terminated slightly before the onset of the unconditioned stimulus.  Amnesic patients
with hippocampal lesions are claimed to be incapable of developing conscious awareness,
so any kind of learning which they are capable of must not rely on such awareness.  In
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addition, awareness measures were used to discriminate between more-aware and less-
aware normal participants.  All participants displayed delay conditioning, but amnesic
participants and less-aware normal participants did not display trace conditioning while
more-aware normal participants did.  They concluded that trace conditioning was
dependent on the hippocampus and awareness while delay conditioning was dependent
on neither.
The methodology used in this study would probably be impractical for SLA
researchers to replicate in its entirety, due to a shortage of people with hippocampal
lesions attempting to learn a second language, but the type of sensitive measure used to
discriminate more-aware and less-aware normal participants probably can be applied in
SLA research.  Immediately following the experiment, normal participants answered a
list of 17 true-false questions on the relationship between the conditioned and
unconditioned stimuli.  They were not allowed to change their answers.  Participants who
answered correctly at above chance (at least 13 correct answers) were classified as more-
aware.  This is an approach that could be used in SLA research to create fairly sensitive
measures of learner awareness for use in postinstruction debriefing sessions.
The difficulty of investigating learner awareness is apparent in the research on
rule-based and instance-based learning conducted by Anderson, et al. (1997).  While in
the first experiment the researchers asked participants whether they were using rules or
examples to base their decisions on, the researchers were dissatisfied with participants’
ability to give this information and stopped asking participants in the other experiments
reported in this article.
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Developing adequate measures of awareness is critical for research on the
relationship between awareness and learning, whether in SLA or in cognitive psychology.
Whether measures of awareness are adequate can be determined by how well they meet
the information criterion and sensitivity criterion (Shanks & St. John, 1994) described in
the previous chapter.  These criteria were developed for studies of learning in the field of
cognitive psychology, but they are applicable to and should be applied in SLA research
on the relationship between language learning and awareness.
Conclusion
It is argued by many SLA researchers and believed by a lot of people in general
that SLA occurs without awareness of what is being learned.  However, there exists no
research on the relationship of awareness to SLA which meets the criteria described in
Chapter One.  For example, Robinson (1995a, 1996a, 1996b, 1997a) admits that the
awareness measure used in his research—asking learners whether they had noticed rules,
had been looking for rules, and were able to verbalize rules—is not very powerful and
does not meet Shanks and St. John’s criteria.  In fact, though, Robinson’s work is a step
forward in SLA, as many studies use no awareness measure at all, assuming that how
learners behave will be determined by their membership in a particular instruction group.
The use of concurrent think-alouds by Leow (1997) and Alanen (1995) to measure
learner awareness can also be seen as a step forward, especially since it is an attempt to
investigate awareness at the point of learning rather than soon after, but it probably does
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not meet either of the criteria listed above since learners are probably unable to
simultaneously explicate all hat they are aware of and complete a pedagogical task.
Meeting Shanks and St. John’s criteria may be an extremely difficult task, but, if the
relationship between SLA and awareness is to be empirically investigated, measures of
awareness must be used which at least attempt to meet them.  The measure of awareness
used in this study will be described in the next chapter.
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Chapter Three
The Present Study--Experiment One
Introduction
The purpose of the present study is the investigation of the relationship between
awareness and learning.  Put simply, the researcher expects that more awareness will
accompany, possibly even cause, more learning.  Of particular interest is the relationship
between awareness and learning among learners receiving incidental instruction, who
have been instructed to process meaning.  Also of interest is whether a comparable
number of learners receiving incidental instruction display awareness when compared to
learners receiving explicit instruction.
The different strategies of learners receiving identical instruction is also of
interest.  Various studies of classroom language learning (e.g., Allwright, 1984; Slimani,
1989, 1992) have shown that learners in language classrooms do not necessarily focus on
what teachers intend them to.  The experimental studies cited above, especially Robinson
(1995a, 1996a, 1996b, 1997a), Leow (1997), and DeKeyser (1995), have also
demonstrated that learners have some control over how they approach a learning task.
Again, it cannot be assumed, for example, that learners receiving incidental instruction
will not focus their attention on and become aware of form.
According to Krashen (1994), second language acquisition, as opposed to
language learning, occurs both incidentally and unconsciously.  It is claimed to be
incidental in the sense that learners are concerned with meaning, not with form.  It is
claimed to be unconscious in the sense that learners are not aware of the formal features
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that they are acquiring.  However, as can be seen in the Robinson (1995a, 1996a, 1996b,
1997a), Leow (1997), and DeKeyser (1995) studies cited above, while acquisition may be
incidental in the sense that learners can learn while carrying out tasks which focus on
meaning, such incidental acquisition is not necessarily unconscious.  Learners may very
well become aware of formal features while working on a meaning-oriented task.  Instead
of being unconscious, successful incidental learning may involve, at the very least,
learners consciously noticing formal features of the language in the process of using and
comprehending the language.
This study aims to investigate to what extent learners receiving two different
kinds of instruction become aware of a target feature during instruction.  It then draws
comparisons between the performance of those learners who display greater awareness of
the target with those who do not.  If some awareness is necessary for learning, and if
different levels of awareness can be captured by the debriefing session which is used in
this study, then those learners who display greater awareness should outperform those
who do not.
Finally, the roles of instance-based and rule-based learning are of somewhat
minor interest in this study.  Does instance-based learning play a more important role
than rule-based learning in the learning of subjects receiving incidental instruction?  Does
instance-based learning play a more important role in the learning of less-aware learners?
Does instance-based learning still play a major role in the learning of learners who have
received explicit instruction?  Does it still play a major role in the learning of more-aware
learners?
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Experiment One
As in many effects of instruction studies, this study compares the learning, as
measured by a pretest and a posttest, of groups of learners receiving different types of
computerized instruction on some feature of English.  There are two instruction groups:
an incidental instruction group and an explicit instruction group.  These are called
instruction groups rather than le rning groups since some learners in the incidental
instruction group may nevertheless try to learn intentionally, while some learners in the
explicit instruction group may not make use of the explicit instruction they receive.  Both
groups are given a computerized grammaticality pretest immediately prior to instruction
and a similar posttest immediately following instruction.  For the incidental group,
instruction consists of being asked to respond true or false to statements which appear on
the computer screen.  Learners in this group are given feedback on the correctness of
their responses.  This instruction is incidental in that learners are asked to process
meaning, not to focus on the target feature.  For the explicit instruction group, instruction
consists of rules of thumb plus examples, which learners are instructed to memorize.
This is explicit in that learners are asked to focus on the target feature.  Learners in all
groups control the pace of both the grammaticality tests and the instruction.
Half the items (40) on the posttest are identical to the items used during
instruction and will have also appeared on the pretest.  The other half are novel items.
All the items used during instruction are on the posttest and on the pretest.
Debriefing sessions conducted in the learners’ first language, Japanese, will be
conducted immediately following completion of the posttest.  The data collected in these
sessions will be used to divide learners into a more-aware learner group and a less-aware
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learner group.  (See below for details.)  The learning success of these two groups will
then be compared.
It is expected, based on the empirical evidence cited above (Doughty, 1990;
DeKeyser, 1995; Robinson 1995a, 1996a, 1996b, 1997a, 1997b), that the explicit
instruction group will outperform the incidental instruction group.  It is also expected,
based on the empirical work of Leow (1997) and Robinson (1995a, 1997a), as well as on
the noticing hypothesis (Schmidt, 1990, 1993, 1994b, 1995), that the more-aware learner
group will outperform the less-aware learner group.  Finally, while it seems that learners
in the explicit instruction group will be more likely to fall into the more-aware learner
group, it is expected that there will be no simple one-to-one correspondence between
instruction groups and learner groups.  In other words, there will be learners from the
explicit instruction group in both the more-aware and less-aware learner groups, as well
as learners from the incidental instruction group in each of the learner groups.
Because of the possibility that the instruction may not result in any long-term
learning, a small-scale delayed posttest will be given to a subset of learners in the more-
aware learning group and the less-aware learning group.  Also, since grammaticality
judgement tests may only tap learners' monitoring ability (Krashen, 1981, 1982, 1994;
Paradis, 1994), this test will involve using English and the target feature in actual
communication.
This study addresses several research questions.  The first three research questions
concern the two types of instruction, incidental and explicit:
1. To what extent will learners receiving computerized instruction, either
incidental or explicit, on the use of definite and zero articles with place names
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show improvement on this use of articles, as measured by correct scores on a
computerized grammaticality judgement test?
2. Will the explicit instruction group display greater improvement than the
incidental instruction group, as would be expected based on the empirical
evidence cited above?
3. As measured by correct scores, to what extent will learners in the explicit
instruction group be better able to generalize from examples used on the
pretest and in instruction to novel items on the posttest, as studied in Robinson
(1997b)?
The next four research questions concern the more-aware and less-aware learner groups:
4. Will more learners in the explicit instruction group than in the incidental
instruction group fall into the more-aware learner group?
5. Will learners in the more-aware learner group display greater improvement
than learners in the less-aware learner group, as predicted by the noticing
hypothesis and as found in Robinson (1995a, 1997a) and Leow (1997)?
6. Will learners in the more-aware learner group be better able to generalize
from examples on the pretest and used in instruction to novel items on the
posttest, as measured by correct scores?
7. Will learners in the more-aware learner group continue to display greater
learning on a delayed, non-computerized, communicative posttest?
A final research question concerns learner response times on previously presented items
and novel items on the posttest:
8. Will there be differences in response times to previously encountered items
and novel items?
Developing an adequately sensitive measure of awareness is imperative for this
study.  The measure of awareness used in Robinson (1995a, 1996a, 1996b, 1997a)
involved asking learners whether they were looking for rules, whether they had noticed
any rules, and whether they could verbalize any rules.  Verbalizations were accepted if
they contained a relevant exemplar or rule.  As Robinson admits, this method of
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measuring awareness was very crude.  For the present study, a much more sensitive
measure is desired.  Leow used comments about spelling changes to classify learners as
aware and any comments about spelling change rules to classify learners as aware with a
rule.  As described above, the comments were all collected by asking learners to think
aloud as they completed the task.  This seems to be an adequately sensitive measure, in
that it probes awareness at the time of learning, but it was decided in this study that think-
alouds could interfere with the learning task by, for example, directing learners’ attention
to the target feature (Shanks & St. John, 1994) or by using up learners’ attentional
capacity and preventing them from being able to attend to learning (Jourdenais, 1996).  It
was also decided that the number of subjects anticipated for this study (60) would render
concurrent think-alouds impractical.  Some of the other methods of assessing noticing
and awareness discussed in the previous chapter, such as underlining special uses of
English (Fotos, 1993) or a vocabulary recognition test (Hulstijn, et al., 1996) are not
appropriate for this study since it involves computerized instruction and is not concerned
with vocabulary acquisition.
In a pilot study, conducted by the researcher, comparing the learning of more-
aware and less-aware learners who had received fairly explicit classroom instruction on
the use of the English article system, learners were asked to write down, in English, what
they had learned about the use of articles immediately after the posttest.  They were told
that they could write rules, examples, or both.  Two serious methodological problems
prevented the researcher from being able to compare learners at different levels of
awareness.  First, learners’ willingness to write in detail in their second language about
the knowledge they had gained varied greatly from learner to learner.  Some learners
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wrote a great deal, including both rules and examples.  Others just made a few,
sometimes illegible, notes.  This may have reflected lack of awareness, but it may also
have been caused by some learners’ general lack of verbosity or by the fact that they were
asked to write in English rather than in their first language.  Obviously, this approach did
not meet the sensitivity criterion of Shanks and St. John’s (1994).  Second, there was too
great a variety of learning targets.  Evidence of learners’ awareness of certain specific
uses of articles in English was obscured by the variety of uses for articles which were
covered in the instruction.
It was determined that if debriefing sessions are going to be effective in
measuring learners’ awareness, they must be conducted orally so that the researcher is
able to probe the learners' awareness and force them to divulge as much information as
possible.  It was also determined the debriefing interviews should be conducted in the
learners’ first language, in this case Japanese, a language in which the researcher is
proficient.  Finally, it was decided that target features should be more focused.
As pointed out by Shanks and St. John (1994) and Robinson (1995a, 1996a,
1996b, 1997a), asking learners to give verbal reports tends not to be a very sensitive
measure of awareness.  However, it was decided that such reports would be the only
practical measure that could be used in this study.  Therefore, it was decided that the
verbal reports must be made as sensitive as possible.  First of all, the reports were
collected immediately following the posttest in order to avoid the problem of learners
being unable to recall what they were aware of during learning (see Green & Hecht,
1992, for an example of this problem).  Next, as described above, the debriefing uses
probing questions (e.g., What else did you learn?  Are you sure you didn’t learn anything
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else?), followed by more direct questions (e.g., Do you use the with mountains?  With
mountain chains?), to explore the extent of learners’ awareness more exhaustively than
would be possible by simply asking learners what they were aware of (Shanks & St.
John, 1994).  The debriefing continued until the researcher was satisfied that enough
information had been collected about how aware learners are of the twenty uses of the
target feature (see below) that were used in this study.  Similar to Clark and Squire
(1998), learners are classified as more-aware if they perform above chance, knowing
correctly at least 15 out of 20 uses.  Finally, again as described above, the debriefing was
conducted in Japanese, the first language of all the learners who participated in this study.
While still rather crude, it was anticipated that these debriefings would be sensitive
enough measures of awareness to discriminate between more-aware and less-aware
learners.  This level of sensitivity is deemed adequate since the study does not rely on any
necessity to identify learners with absolutely no awareness.
One objection that could be raised about this study is that it is rather obvious that
learners who display more awareness during the debriefing will have performed better on
the posttest.  After all, the posttest and the measure of awareness seem to be measuring
the same thing—whether learners know how to use definite and zero articles with place
names.  However, in the debriefing sessions, the researcher only asks questions to push
learners to reveal their awareness of rules—in other words, their explicit knowledge.  The
researcher does not ask learners to apply their knowledge, whether it be explicit or
implicit, of the use of articles with place names.  If learning can truly occur without
awareness, then it should be possible to gain knowledge of h  definite and zero articles
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are used without actually being aware of the knowledge.  In this study, though, it was not
expected that learning without awareness would occur.
A second objection to the methodology of this study is that it is not all that
difficult for learners in the incidental instruction group to figure out what the target
features are.  For example, Reber (1989) states that the stimulus domain must be
sufficiently complex in order for implicit learning to occur.  In this study, though, the
pretest should alert many learners in this group that the instruction concerns the use of
definite and zero articles with place names.  However, one of the main purposes of this
study is to observe how the learners themselves choose to focus their attention.  Some
learners in the incidental instruction group may follow instructions and focus on
meaning, but others may also focus on the target feature.  In order to compare the
learning of incidental instruction group learners who choose to focus on forms with the
learning of those who do not, the more forms-oriented learners must focus on the right
thing.  If learners followed a strategy of attending to forms but direct their attention to
something other than the target feature, it would be impossible to discriminate them from
less forms-oriented learners.  For this reason, it must be possible for these learners to
realize what the instruction is all about.
Related to this, some learners in the explicit instruction group may follow
instructions and focus on the target feature, but others may just try to get through the
experiment as quickly as possible.  It must be possible for these learners, whose personal
preference may be to ignore formal features of the language, either to fail to learn or to
forget what they have learned.  For this reason, a distracter task followed the instruction.
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The Target Feature
It was decided that the target feature of instruction must meet four criteria, in
addition to being a feature of the English language, with large scope and high reliability
(Hulstijn & De Graaff, 1994), which learners of English as a Second Language (ESL)
would benefit from acquiring.  The first criterion was that it be outside the scope of
Universal Grammar (UG) (Hulstijn & De Graaff, 1994).  The second was that the use of
the feature be explainable by a set of simple rules of thumb (Hulstijn, 1995).  The third
was that the feature would be complicated enough to be a challenge for learners to master
(Hulstijn & De Graaff, 1994). The fourth was that the feature would allow prior learning
to be controlled for.  The linguistic feature which was eventually chosen for this study
was the use of either the definite article or zero article with place names (e.g., th Nile
River, Mount Everest).
It is difficult to determine for sure whether or not a given feature is within or
outside the scope of UG.  Of course, the issue of whether UG is even relevant to SLA is
certainly not settled (Anderson, 1995), and there are those who argue that even first
language acquisition can be explained without resorting to U.G. (e.g., Anderson, 1983;
Winter & Reber, 1994).  However, it is important, for the purposes of this study, that the
target feature be outside the scope of UG since, if UG plays a role in SLA, the innate
nature of UG may obscure the role of awareness in learning the feature.  Also, this paper
is not concerned with any possible relationship between UG and SLA, between UG and
L2 instruction, or between UG and awareness.  Therefore, it was thought important to
avoid UG altogether.  While there seems to be a lack of research or theory indicating that
the use of definite and zero articles with place names is outside UG, there is a similar lack
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of evidence that it falls within the scope of UG.  This particular use of articles is rather
arbitrary and it would seem safe to assume that UG does not play a role.
In this study, in order to compare more-aware and less-aware learners as well as
learners in different instruction groups, it is hoped that some learners in each instruction
group become aware of simple rules for this use of articles.  It is important that learners
in the explicit instruction group, who are presented with rules and examples during
instruction, be able to understand the rules so that they can apply them when they are
tested.  It is also important that those learners in the incidental instruction group who
focus their attention on article use during instruction have the chance to figure out what
the rules are.  Therefore, the criterion that the target feature be explainable by a set of
simple rules of thumb was adopted.  The use of definite and zero articles with place
names meets this second criterion.  Even though much more complicated linguistic
explanations of this target feature exist (Hewson, 1972; Kaluza, 1981; see below), when
to use the definite article and when to use the zero article can be described by extremely
simple rules:  Use “the” with rivers.  Do not use “the” with single mountains.  These
rules not only have simple syntax, but, they can also be expressed without using any
metalinguistic terminology.  To the extent that learners know vocabulary such as river
and mountain, relatively low proficiency in English should not prevent them from being
able to understand these rules.  They also seem simple enough for some learners, given
enough input, to figure out on their own.
The third criterion, that the feature be complicated enough to be a challenge for
learners to master, may seem to contradict the second.  However, the second criterion
concerns the simplicity of the rule statements, while the third criterion concerns the
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complexity of how the feature is used.  If the feature’s use is too simple, it would be too
easy for learners to master and differences in the quality of learning would be difficult to
detect.  For example, it would seem that the use of the two forms of the English indefinite
article (a/an) is very simple, based only on the initial sound of the following word.
Explained as a pedagogical rule, one rule would be sufficient:  U e an b fore a vowel
sound and a elsewhere.  It would also probably be simple for any learner who noticed this
feature to master it rather quickly, at least in speaking if not in writing.
The system for using definite and zero articles with place names, though, is quite
complex and potentially quite confusing.  Master (1990) argues that this use of articles
appears to be arbitrary and cannot be explained by pedagogical rules developed to teach
other uses of articles.  For example, the is used with mountain chains and island groups
(the Rocky Mountains, the Hawaiian Islands), but not with the names of individual
mountains and islands (Mount McKinley, Oahu).  (The Big Island, used in the state of
Hawai‘i to refer to the island of Hawai‘i, is an exception.)  The is used with the names of
universities that contain the word of (the University of Hawai‘i), but not with the names
of universities that do not (West Virginia University).  (The Ohio State University i  a
notable exception.)  Also, most country names take zero article (M xico), but some take
the (the United States of Mexico).  Attempts to find systematicity in this use of articles
(see below) are not very successful at removing this complexity.  Master (1994), in a
study on the effects of systematic instruction on the use of articles over a ten-week
quarter, seems to have recognized this lack of systematicity and omitted the teaching of
articles with place names.
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The existence of prior learning is a common problem in research involving a
natural language, especially such a widely studied language as English.  It would
probably be impossible to eliminate completely the possibility of prior learning in
investigations of ESL learners.  However, it should be possible to find a feature of
English which learners do not seem to know much about, either explicitly or implicitly.
For example, Robinson (1995a, 1996a, 1996b, 1997a) controlled for prior learning by
choosing learners on the basis of incorrect grammaticality judgements of grammatical
sentences based on the easy and hard rules used in his study.  Similarly to Robinson,
grammaticality judgements were used in this study to control for prior learning—learners
who performed above chance on the pretest (52 or higher out of 80, .01 probability) were
removed from the study.  Also, it has been the researcher’s experience that even learners
who have been studying English for over six years in formal contexts, in addition to
living in English-speaking countries, rarely know much at all about the use of articles
with place names and that many pedagogical grammars do not deal with this feature.
The use of definite and zero articles with place names adequately meets the four
criteria listed above.  In addition, it seems to be of large scope and fairly high reliability
(Hulstijn & De Graaff, 1994; Hulstijn, 1995), even though there are exceptions to how
articles are used (the Gambia ( country as well as a river in Western Africa), the Ohio
State University).  Also, when the researcher has taught this feature to ESL students,
some of them have commented on the usefulness of the instruction.  (No one has ever
commented on its uselessness.)  Therefore, it was decided that ESL learners would
benefit from acquiring this feature.
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Even though the researcher has often been told by learners that instruction on this
use of articles is useful, it should be noted that there also seems to be negligible
communicative content in the use of zero and definite articles with place names.  It seems
unlikely that omitting the definite article would cause confusion, and, indeed, in certain
situations, such as on maps or in a hotel's promotional literature, the definite article is
often omitted.  This is another sense in which this use of articles is different from other
uses of the English article system.  Even though Master (1994) argues that correct article
usage only becomes important in writing and that in speaking incorrect usage is unlikely
to lead to communicative problems, evidence from studies in language processing
reviewed in Anderson (1995) indicates that articles, particularly the definite article,
convey more meaning than they are often given credit for, even in speaking.  This does
not seem to apply, though, to the arbitrary use of articles that is the focus of this study.
There seems to be very little research in the field of linguistics into this use of
zero and definite articles.  However, one linguist, Hewson (1972), has attempted to
develop semantically-based criteria for choosing the definite or zero article, and this
attempt in itself is indicative of the complexity of the system.  According to Hewson, the
majority of place names take zero article.  However, plural or collective place names take
the definite article, possibly in order to avoid suggesting that a plural place name is a
common noun unlimited in number.  For example, calling th  H waiian Islands ju t
Hawaiian Islands would suggest that there exists a virtually unlimited number of things
called hawaiian islands, just as the phrase the cups refers to a finite set of cups while
cups is potentially infinite.  This use of the definite article includes not only such
obviously plural entities as mountain chains and island groups, but also things such as
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unions and federations.  The United States of America takes the definite article because it
is seen as a federation of several states.  This explanation seems to make some sense, but
it is not clear why, for example, the Republic of Ireland should take the definite article.
Also according to Hewson (1972), the names of places which are hard to define or do not
have easily definable boundaries also take the definite article.  For example, it is hard to
define what exactly is a desert and what is just a fairly dry place, so the Sahara Desert
takes the definite article.  However, as Celce-Murcia and Larson-Freeman (1983) point
out in a discussion of Hewson’s system, it is not clear why, for example, oceans take the
definite article (the Pacific Ocean), while bays take the zero article (Kaneohe Bay).  Also,
there are many exceptions to Hewson’s system (e.g., The Hague).
Kaluza (1981) has also attempted to find sytematicity in the use of definite or zero
articles with place names.  In this system, plural names—island chains, groups of lakes,
mountain chains--are seen as taking the.  Compound forms, made up of more than one
word, take the definite or zero article depending on the head noun.  When the head is
arbitrary, meaning that it has no semantic content other than being a name (Brita ), or
once had semantic content but has become disassociated with that content over time
(Newfoundland), then the compound noun takes zero article, just as simple arbitrary
names take zero article.  For example, the head of Great Britain is Britain, which is
arbitrary, so Great Britain takes zero article.  When, though, the head is a countable
noun, such as kingdom, the compound takes the definite article, making it explicit exactly
what is being referred to.  An example is “the United Kingdom (which Kingdom (sic)?
The kingdom that is united under one monarch, now Elisabeth II)” (p. 65).  This
distinction would seem to account for names such as the Republic of Ireland (which
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republic?  The republic founded in the place called Ireland.)  It would also account for
differences such as the University of Hawai‘i andWest Virginia University.  In the
former, the head noun is iversity, a countable noun, so the definite article is necessary.
In the latter, the head noun is West Virginia, n arbitrary name, so the compound name
takes zero article.
These descriptions of the use of zero and definite articles with place names are
interesting from a linguistic point of view, but it seems doubtful that they correspond, in a
psychologically real way, with the knowledge of native speakers and native-like ESL
speakers.  Such knowledge seems more likely to be based on memory for specific
instances, which may be either retrieved directly or used by analogy.  In this study,
explicit instruction and measurement of learners’ awareness will not be based on the
descriptions given above, but, rather, on a list of rules of thumb for article use, which can
be derived from specific examples.
Both Hewson (1972) and Kaluza (1981) provide lists of place names that take and
do not take definite articles.  The researcher used these lists, lists provided in a widely
used pedagogical grammar, Grammar Dimensions 2 (Riggenbach & Samuda, 1997), and
his own intuition to choose the place names which would be used in the study.  Ten types
of place names which take zero article were chosen:  schools (Kaimuki E ementary
School ), most countries (Canada), universities without the word of, (West Virginia
University), parks (Kapiolani Park), single mountains (Mount Fuji), parts of continents
(Central Africa), hospitals (General Hospital, the Queen’s Medical Center is a notable
exception), single lakes (Lake Geneva), bays (Hanauma Bay), and single islands (Oahu).
Also chosen were ten types of place names which take the definite article:  tourist
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attractions (the Washington Monument), regions not including a continent or country
name (the East Coast), island chains (the Hawaiian Islands), hotels (the Hilton Hotel),
mountain chains (the Alps), certain country names (th  United States), universities with of
in the name (the University of Hawai‘i), rivers (the Yellow River), peninsulas (the Korean
Peninsula), and associations (the Young Women’s Christian Association).  (Associations,
admittedly, are a rather marginal member of the place name category.)  A paper and
pencil pilot grammaticality test (see below) also included city names and continent
names.  However, these were removed because learners scored almost 100% on
judgements of these items.  (See Appendix A for a complete list of items that were used
on the pretest and posttest and during instruction.  See Appendix B for a list of the 20
rules of thumb.)
Method
Participants.  Sixty young-adult Japanese ESL learners studying at the Hawai‘i
English Language Program (HELP), Intercultural Communications College (ICC), and
other English language schools in Hawai‘i participated in this study4.  They were paid
five dollars each for their participation.  Learners were randomly assigned to one of the
instruction groups.  No intact classes were used.  All learners had studied English for at
least six years in formal foreign language classrooms.  In order to control for prior
learning, learners who scored above chance (52 or higher) on the pretest were removed
from the study.  All learners are intermediate in that they are able to understand the task
directions provided on the computer screen, but not advanced enough to command
already this use of articles.
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Materials.  All materials, except the delayed posttest, were computerized using
PsyScope software (Cohen, et. al, 1993).
A grammaticality judgement test containing 80 items was used to pretest learners.
Each item consisted of the question, “Which is correct?” followed by two choices
numbered one and two.  For example:
Which is correct?
1. Nile River
2. the Nile River
The items appeared on the computer screen one at a time.  Learners responded by
pressing one or two on the computer keyboard.  The next item appeared on the computer
screen immediately after the previous item had been answered.  No feedback on
correctness was given.  PsyScope recorded learners’ responses and response times.  In
order to allow learners to practice responding to items in this format, the pretest was
preceded by ten addition problems such as:
Which is correct?
1.  4+5=9
2.  4+5=20
In order to develop a test consisting of items which would be unknown to the
learners, a 99 item pencil-and-paper pilot test was administered to ten predominantly
Japanese (seven Japanese, two Korean, and one Chinese) learners who were believed to
be of approximately the same proficiency as the learners who would participate in the
study.  Item facility (IF) was then calculated for each item, and items with a high IF were
examined in an effort to find categories of items that learners seemed to know already.
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The IF figures were between 0.40 and 0.60 for the majority of items, indicating that
learners were guessing on most.
After examining items with a high IF, the researcher found that city names (no
article), store and restaurant names (no article), continent names (no article), and certain
country names presented little or no difficulty for the learners.  Learners generally had no
problem with country names such as France, Mexico, and Canada.  However, they had
much more difficulty, operating at around chance level, with country names which take
the definite article, such as the United States, he Republic of Ireland, and the United
Kingdom.  Since this contrast in the use of zero article and the definite article with the
names of countries seemed to be difficult for learners, it was decided not to remove
country names from the test.  Also, while continent names seemed to be very easy, names
such as Central America and South Asia were much more problematic.  Therefore, while
continent names were removed from the test, this latter category of name was retained.
Finally, city names and store names were removed from the test.  All the item categories
which were removed were ones that take the zero article.
Developing a reliable test was a top priority.  However, since the learners who
took the pretest operated at around chance level, and since this meant that learners tended
to answer about half the items correctly and that each item tended to be answered
correctly by about half the learners, the K-R20 reliability estimates for the pilot test were
extremely low.  Since the major part of the K-R20 formula is one minus the sum of item
variance (IV) divided by the total test variance, if the sum of IV is almost the same as the
total variance, the K-R20 reliability estimate will be very close to zero.  If the sum of IV
is a little higher than the total variance, the K-R20 estimate will actually be negative.  On
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the pilot test, IFs tended to be around 0.5, yielding IVs of 0.25, the highest possible IV,
while total test variance was rather low since all learners performed around chance level.
The result was a negative K-R20 estimate of –0.063.  In order to see whether the test
would yield a better reliability estimate when all learners were not performing at chance
level, a revised 80-item test was administered to the same ten learners who had taken the
initial pilot test, plus one additional Japanese learner, after they had received instruction
on the use of articles with place names.  This time, learners performed at much higher
than chance levels, and the K-R20 reliability estimate was 0.733, a fairly high level of
reliability.  In addition, the even-odd correlation was 0.711 and the full test reliability,
using the Spearman-Brown Prophecy formula was 0.831.  It was expected that reliability
estimates on the computerized version of the pretest would also be quite low since only
learners who perform around the level of chance were to be included in the study.
Incidental instruction consisted of 40 statements, each containing one of the items
used on the pretest.  For example:  The Nile River is the longest river in Africa. Each
statement appeared on the computer screen one at a time.  Half the statements were true
and half were false.  Learners were instructed to decide whether each statement was true
or false and then to press the space bar for the correct answer.  They then pressed the
space bar again to continue.  This instruction was called incidental since learners were
instructed and required by the task to respond to content, not to focus on formal features.
An example of the target feature, though, appeared in each statement.
Explicit instruction consisted of 20 rules of thumb presented with an example.
Each rule of thumb appeared on the screen with exactly one example.  Learners were able
to view the rule and example as long as they pleased and pressed the space bar to
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continue.  They were instructed to memorize each rule and example.  After all 20 rules
had been presented, the learners viewed, one at a time, 20 more examples, one for each
rule.  Again, they were instructed to memorize each example and to press the space bar to
go on to the next example.  There were a total of 40 items presented as examples of the
rules, two items for each rule.
The posttest followed the same format as the pretest.  It was preceded by one
practice item similar to the items used before the pretest, except that this practice item
involved subtraction rather than addition.  The posttest contained the 40 items from the
pretest that had been used in instruction and 40 novel items.  The 40 novel items were all
based on the rules of thumb used during the explicit instruction.  The K-R20 reliability
estimate is reported in the results section below.
Learners performed a distracter task following the instruction.  On the distracter
task, learners were presented with ten pairs of sentences, one pair at a time.  They were
instructed to press s if they thought the two sentences in a pair had the same meaning and
d if they thought the two sentences had different meanings.  They received feedback on
their choice.  The feedback consisted of the word rightprinted in blue letters or the word
wrong printed in red letters.  The computer then instructed them to press the space bar to
continue.
A subset of learners, five in the explicit instruction group (three more-aware and
two less-aware) and five in the incidental instruction group (all less-aware), took part in a
non-computerized delayed posttest.  On this test, learners were asked questions such as,
What is the longest river in the world?  All questions were asked and answered orally, in
a relaxed atmosphere with snacks and drinks, in order to simulate as closely as possible a
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natural conversation.  (See Appendix C for a list of questions used on the delayed
posttest.)  All conversations were recorded and transcribed.  Based on the transcriptions,
frequencies of correct and incorrect use of articles with place names were counted for
more-aware and less-aware learners.  This was not too difficult since each place name
requires either a definite or a zero article.  For example, if they had answered the above
question with e Nile, their answer would have been coded as correct.  If they had
answered it with just Nile, their answer would have been coded as incorrect.  If an answer
had been factually inaccurate (the Kanawha) but their article use had been correct, it
would have been coded as correct.  If an answer had made absolutely no sense—they had
answered the above question with the East Coast— hen it would have been removed
from the analysis.  Only a subset of learners was used for the delayed posttest since it was
impossible to schedule a time to take the delayed posttest with all learners and because it
would have been impractical to transcribe and analyze this type of test for 60 learners.
Assessing learner awareness.  A  described above, learner awareness was
assessed through oral debriefing sessions, in Japanese, conducted immediately following
the posttest.  Also as described above, learners who were able to state at least 15 (out of
20, above chance at p<.05) rules for the use of the target feature were classified as more-
aware.   The debriefing sessions were recorded and transcribed in order to provide a
record of whether the learners were able to state correctly the critical number of rules
and/or examples.
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Analyses and Hypotheses
Answers to the first three research questions, which concern learning in the two
instruction groups, were investigated by testing the following three hypotheses:
H1:  Learners in both groups will have higher correct scores on the posttest than
on the pretest.
H2:  There will be a significantly greater decrease in correct scores on the posttest
compared to the pretest by learners in the explicit instruction group.
H3:  Learners in the explicit instruction group will make fewer errors on novel
items on the posttest than learners in the incidental instruction group.
The answers to research questions four through seven, which concern learners in
the more-aware and less-aware learner groups, were investigated by testing the following
4 hypotheses:
H4:  A significantly greater number of learners in the explicit instruction group
than in the incidental instruction group will fall into the more-aware learner
group.
H5:  There will be a significantly greater increase in correct scores on the posttest
compared to the pretest by learners in the more-aware learner group.
H6:  Learners in the more-aware learner group will make fewer errors on novel
items on the posttest than learners in the less-aware learner group.
H7:  Learners in the more-aware learner group will continue to show greater
learning than learners in the less-aware learner group on the delayed posttest.
The final research question motivates the following hypothesis:
H8:  Average response times by all learners will be faster on previously
encountered items than on novel items on the posttest.
Two repeated-measures MANOVAs and follow-up univariate ANOVAs were
used to test H1, H2, H3, H5, H6, and H8.  Eta-squared was used to test the strength of
association of all significant results.  The relationship between awareness and
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performance on the posttest was also tested through a correlational analysis of the
number of correct rules learners are able to provide during the debriefing interview and
the number correct on the posttest.  A pair of two-by-two chi-square tests were planned to
test H4 and H7, but as described below, H7 was not tested.  Because of the large number
of statistical tests, alpha was set at the rather conservative level of .01.
The first MANOVA was used to test for differences between instruction groups.
The independent variables for this MANOVA were instruction group (explicit or
incidental), and item type (repeated or novel).  The dependent variables were correct
score (repeated measure, pretest and posttest) and response time (repeated measure,
pretest and posttest).
Because the grouping of learners in the learner groups was different from their
grouping in the instruction groups, a second MANOVA was necessary to test for
differences between the two learner groups.  The independent variables for this
MANOVA were learner group (more-aware or less-aware) and item type.  The dependent
variables were, again, correct score (repeated measure, pretest and posttest) and response
time (repeated measure, pretest and posttest).
The first chi-square test was used to compare the number of explicit instruction
group learners falling into the more-aware learner group, the number of explicit
instruction group learners falling into the less-aware learner group, the number of
incidental instruction group learners falling into the more-aware learner group, and the
number of incidental instruction group learners falling into the less-aware learner group.
There were two variables:  instruction group and learning group.
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The second chi-square test was to compare the frequencies of correct and
incorrect use of the target items by more-aware and less-aware learners on the delayed
posttest.  The two variables were to be learner group and correctness of use.  Again, this
test was not actually used, as will be explained in the results section below.
Results
Descriptive statistics of pretest and posttest.  One purpose of the pretest was to
control for prior learning.  Therefore, it was decided to remove learners who scored
above chance, 52 or higher (p<.01).  Eleven of the original 60 learners, six in the explicit
instruction condition and five in the incidental instruction condition, were thus removed
and replaced.  In addition, one of the replacement learners in the explicit instruction
condition was also removed and replaced.  However, even though prior learning was at
least partially controlled for, the pretest results indicate that it still played a role.  The
mean on the pretest was 44.5.  Both the median and the mode were 45.  The standard
deviation was 4.13.  The low and high scores were 28 and 51.  The distribution of pretest
scores is displayed graphically in Figure 3.1.  Learners as a whole seemed to be operating
somewhat above chance.
Item facility (IF) scores, that is the proportion of learners who answered an item
correctly, were calculated to see which items were already known by the majority of
learners.  The mean IF was 0.5556, with a standard deviation of 0.1836, a low of 0.2000,
and a high of 0.9500.  The items with the eight highest and four lowest IFs are displayed
in Table 3.1.  The four items that were most often answered correctly are names of
countries without the.  Interestingly, none of the items with the highest IFs take the, while
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Figure 3.1:  Pretest Results
all the items with the lowest IFs do take the.  This implies that items which do not take
the were easier than items which do.  In order to see whether this is true, all 80 items
were placed in a rank order scale from one to 80, with one being the item with the highest
IF, that is the easiest item, and 80 being the item with the lowest IF, or the most difficult
item.  A Mann Whitney U test, which actually had not been previously planned, was then
calculated in order to see whether items which take the zero article ranked higher than
items which take th .  The observed z-score was -6.086, significant at p<.01.  Items
which take the zero article were indeed easier.  This indicates a bias among learners to
choose the zero article on the pretest.  (Mann Whitney U, a nonparametric test, was used
instead of a more powerful parametric test since the relative ease or difficulty of test
items was not a central concern of the study and the researcher wanted to avoid problems
with probability levels which could be caused by using too many powerful tests.)
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Table 3.1:  Items with High and Low IF                                                                                
High IFs                    Item                            Low IFs                    Item                            
0.95 Canada 0.20 the Falkland Islands
0.95 France 0.27 the Moldive Islands
0.95 Russia 0.28 the Northwest
0.95 Italy 0.30 the Izu Peninsula
0.90 Saipan
0.90 Tahiti
0.85 Molokai
0.82                            Kaimuki Elementary School                                                              
Learners were much more spread out on the posttest.  The mean was 52.23, with a
standard deviation of 12.35, a low of 30, and a high of 78.  This greater dispersion was to
be expected if some learners learned more than others.  The distribution of posttest scores
is displayed graphically in Figure 3.2.  On the posttest, learners' scores appeared to fall
into two groups.  In addition, the bias for choosing the zero article over the definite article
ded not seem to be playing a role on the posttest.  As for the pretest, a Mann Whitney U
test was calculated.  The z-score turned out to be -1.030, not significant at p<.01.
Figure 3.2:  Posttest Results
There was a large difference between the standard deviations, and thus the
variances of the pretest and the posttest, indicating that the assumption for ANOVA of
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equivalent variances (Brown, 1988; Hatch & Lazaraton, 1991; Guilford & Fruchter,
1973) may not have been met.  The standard deviations on the pretest were, again, 4.13
and 12.35, respectively.  This makes the variances of the pretest and posttest 17.0569 and
152.5225, quite a large difference.  Applying the Fmax test of dividing the variance of the
posttest by that of the pretest yields an F-ratio of 8.942, which is significant at p<.01
(df=58, 1).  According to Brown (1988), this should not be a major problem unless there
is at least a ratio of three to one between sample sizes.  According to Guilford and
Fruchter (1973), not meeting this assumption means that the probabilities may be a bit
higher than they seem.  This means that, with an alpha level of .01, a probability of .008
or .009 might be suspect.  While the comparisons between more-aware and less-aware
groups described below are unbalanced, the ratio between groups is smaller than three to
one.  In addition, the probabilities of the significant MANOVA and ANOVA results
reported below were .0001, so it is unlikely that the observed difference in variances is a
problem.
Reliability estimates were calculated for both the pretest and the posttest.  As in
the pilot study described above, it was expected that the K-R 20 reliability estimates for
the pretest would be extremely low, possibly even negative, but would be much better for
the posttest.  Indeed, the K-R20 reliability estimate for the pretest was -0.0035 and the
correlation between the first 40 and second 40 items was 0.1208, with a full-test
reliability, calculated by the Spearman-Brown Prophecy formula, of 0.2156.  These
extremely low scores probably reflect the large amount of guessing on the pretest.
However, the K-R20 reliability estimate for the posttest was 0.9006 and the correlation
between the first and second 40 items was 0.9158, with a full-test reliability of 0.9560.
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These estimates indicate that, when learners were not relying primarily on guessing, the
test could reliably separate learners on the basis of their knowledge of the use of th  and
zero article with place names.
Comparison of instruction groups.  Time on task was measured to the minute
and was roughly equivalent for both instruction groups.  The median time of the
incidental instruction group was 21.5 minutes, with a minimum of 11 minutes and a
maximum of 32.  The median time of the explicit instruction group was 22 minutes, with
a minimum of 15 and a maximum of 31.
A repeated-measures MANOVA comparison of instruction groups indicated that
there were differences between pretest and posttest correct scores (Wilks' Lambda=0.618,
p=0.0001), between groups on their correct scores (Wilks' Lambda=0.560, p=0.0001),
and between average response times on the pretest and posttest (Wilks' Lambda=0.400,
p=0.0001).  Significant effects were not found for any interaction between number
correct and item type (repeated versus novel) (p=0.7943) or for any interaction between
number correct, item type, and group (p=0.8232).  Nor was a significant interaction found
between response time and group (p=0.3734), response time and item type (p=0.1862), or
response time, item type, and group (p=0.8388).
The pretest and posttest mean scores for each group and the means of each
participant's mean response times are shown in Table 3.2.  The results of follow-up
repeated measures ANOVAs are shown in Tables 3.3 and 3.4.  Finally, Table 3.5 gives
the strengths of association, eta squared for repeated measures, of the significant
ANOVA effects.
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Table 3.2:  Mean Scores and Response Times                                                                       
Test                Group              Mean Score     sd                     Mean RT         sd                     
Pretest Explicit 44.433 3.657 4442.0597 1313.3685
Pretest Incidental 44.467 4.703 5930.8375 1203.4157
Posttest Explicit 60.967 10.270 3020.9929 909.2106
Posttest            Incidental        43.500             6.842               2961.2221       1216.1025       
Eighty is the highest possible score.  Response times are averaged across items and then
across participants; given in milliseconds.
Table 3.3:  ANOVA Comparison of Scores and Groups                                                      
Source                                     df         Sum of Sq.       Mean Sq.         F-value            p          
Group 1 2279.408 2279.408 40.183 .0001*
Subject 58 3290.083 56.726
Test 1 1817.408 1817.408 49.460 .0001*
Test * Group 1 2296.875 2296.875 62.508 .0001*
Test * Subject                         58        2131.217         36.745                                                 
dependant variable:  score; *significant at p<.01
Table 3.4:  ANOVA Comparison of Response Times                                                         
Source                                     df         Sum of Sq.       Mean Sq.         F-value            p          
Group 1 674,300 674,300 .308 .5811
Subject 58 127,000,0002,190,000
Test 1 53,140,000 53,140,000 96.790 .0001*
Test * Group 1 243,800 243,800 .444 .5078
Test * Subject                         58        31,840,000      549,000                                               
dependant variable:  response time; *significant at p<.01
Table 3.5:  Eta Squared for Significant Effects                                                                    
Effect                                      SS Effect                   SS Total                    Eta Square       
Group (correct) 2279.408 11814.991 .193
Test (correct) 1817.408 11814.991 .154
Test * Group (correct) 2296.875 11814.991 .194
Test (response time)                53,140,000                 213,000,000               .249                
Eta Squared equals SS Effect divided by SS Total
As can be seen in Table 3.2, the explicit instruction group mean score and the
incidental instruction group mean score were almost the same on the pretest.  However,
the posttest mean of the explicit group was much higher than either that group's pretest
mean or the posttest mean of the incidental group.  In fact, the posttest mean of the
incidental group was slightly lower than that group's pretest mean.  The significant test by
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group interaction effect indicates that the difference between the posttest score of the
explicit group and the posttest score of the incidental group is significant, as is the
difference between the posttest score of the explicit group and that group's pretest score.
As can be seen in Table 3.5, the test by group interaction accounts for 19.4 percent of the
variance in score data.
As can also be seen in Table 3.2, mean response times dropped for both groups
between pretest and posttest.  This change is significant and accounts for 24.9% of the
variance in the response time data.  While the average response time of the incidental
group dropped more than that of the explicit group, there was not a significant interaction
between group and response time.
Comparison of Learner Groups.  Learners were classified as more-aware if they
are able to answer correctly at least 15 of the 20 questions on the debriefing
questionnaire.  Each of these questions corresponds to exactly one rule of thumb for the
use of definite and zero articles with place names.  Nineteen of the 30 learners in the
explicit instruction group were thus classified as more-aware and 11 as less-aware.  All
30 learners in the incidental instruction group were classified as less-aware.  This
difference in frequencies is significant (chi square = 27.8, p<.01, df=1) which is not
surprising given that almost two thirds of one group and none of the other group are
classified as more-aware.  (Chi square was used to compare the frequencies of more-
aware and less-aware learners from each instruction group since the study relies on
dividing learners into these two learner groups.)  Table 3.6 displays the number of
questions answered correctly by participants in each group.  No participants answered
fewer than seven questions correctly.
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Table 3.7:  Frequency of Participants Correctly Answering a Given
Number of Awareness Questions                                                       
Correct Answers         Explicit Instruction     Incidental Instruction  
20 1 0
19 1 0
18 3 0
17 5 0
16 5 0
15 4 0
14 3 5
13 2 4
12 1 12
11 1 1
10 2 4
9 0 3
8 1 1
            7                                1                                0                    
Time on task was similar for both learner groups.  The median time on task of the
less-aware group was 22 minutes, with a minimum of 11 and a maximum of 32.  The
median time of the more-aware group was also 22, with a minimum of 15 and a
maximum of 30.
A repeated-measures MANOVA comparison of learner groups indicates that there
were differences between pretest and posttest scores (Wilks' Lambda=0.656, p=0.0001),
between groups on the tests (Wilks' Lambda=0.871, p=0. 00 ), and between average
response times on the pretest and posttest (Wilks' Lambda=0.457, p=0.0001).  Significant
effects were not found for any interaction between test and item type (repeated versus
novel) (p=0.9591) or for any interaction between test, item type, and group (p=0.7535).
Nor was a significant interaction found between response time and group (p=0.0700),
response time and item type (p=0.1605), or response time, item type, and group
(p=0.6609).  Obviously, these results closely reflect the results of comparisons between
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instruction groups, with similar differences found between the explicit and incidental
instruction groups and the more-aware and less-aware learner groups.
The pretest and posttest mean scores for each learner group and the means of each
learner's mean response time are shown in Table 3.7.  The results of follow-up repeated-
Table 3.7:  Mean Scores and Response Times of Learner Groups                                         
Test                Group              Mean Score     sd                     Mean RT         sd                     
Pretest More-aware45.316 3.742 4466.229 1420.6312
Pretest Less-aware 44.415 4.387 4255.191 1183.0058
Posttest More-aware66.316 7.032 3016.662 947.0381
Posttest            Less-aware      45.707             8.044               2979.265         1126.4222       
Eighty is the highest possible score.  Response times are averaged across items and then
across participants; given in milliseconds.
Table 3.8:  Repeated-Measures ANOVA Comparison of Scores and Learner Groups          
Source                                     df         Sum of Sq.       Mean Sq.         F-value            p          
Group 1 3003.461 3003.461 66.759 .0001*
Subject 58 2609.406 44.990
Test 1 3226.123 3226.123 98.938 .0001*
Test * Group 1 2521.223 2521.223 77.320 .0001*
Test * Subject                         58        1891.244         32.608                                                 
dependent variable:  score; *significant at p<.01
Table 3.9:  Repeated-Measures ANOVA Comparison of Response Times and
 Learner Groups                                                                                                                    
Source                                     df         Sum of Sq.       Mean Sq.         F-value            p          
Group 1 400,700 400,700 .183 .6708
Subject 58 127,300,0002,195,000
Test 1 48,220,000 48,220,000 87.700 .0001*
Test * Group 1 195,700 195,700 .356 .5531
Test * Subject                         58        31,890,000      549,900                                               
dependent variable:  response time; *significant at p<.01
Table 3.10:  Eta Squared for Significant Effects                                                                 
Effect                                      SS Effect                   SS Total                    Eta Square       
Group (score) 3003.461 13251.457 .227
Test (score) 3226.123 13251.457 .243
Test * Group (score) 2521.223 13251.457 .190
Test (response time)                48,220,000                 208,010,000               .232     
Eta Squared equals SS Effect divided by SS Total
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measures ANOVAs are shown in Tables 3.8 and 3.9.  Finally, Table 3.10 gives the
strengths of association, eta square for repeated measures, of significant ANOVA effects.
As can be seen in Table 3.7, the more-aware group mean score and the less-aware
group mean score were almost the same on the pretest.  However, the posttest mean of
the more-aware group was much higher than either that group's pretest mean or the
posttest mean of the less-aware group.  The posttest mean of the less-aware group was
almost unchanged from its pretest mean.  The significant effect for group and the
significant interaction between group and test indicate that the difference between the
posttest score of the more-aware group and the posttest score of the less-aware group is
significant, as is the difference between the posttest score of the more-aware group and
that group's pretest score.  As can be seen in Table 3.10, the group effect accounts for
22.7% of the variance in the score data and the test by group interaction accounts for
19.0%.
As can also be seen in Table 3.7, response time dropped for both groups between
pretest and posttest.  This change is significant and accounts for 23.2% of the variance in
the response time data.  Once again, the results of the learner group comparisons closely
reflect the results of the instruction group comparisons.
In dividing learners into more-aware and less-aware groups, a continuous scale,
the number of correct answers out of 20, on the debriefing questionnaire, was converted
to a two-level nominal scale.  In making this conversion, some information about
learners' awareness was lost, as can be seen in the fact that five learners in the incidental
instruction group missed being classified as more-aware by just one question.  In order to
compensate for this loss, a correlation was calculated between learners' awareness levels
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(zero through 20) and their posttest scores.  This correlation was 0.7971 (significant at
p<.01, r2=0.6354).  This is surprisingly high, so a correlation between awareness levels
and pretest scores was also calculated.  This correlation was 0.1988 (not significant at
p<.01, r2=0.0395).  This supports the results of the comparisons between learner groups
reported above, indicating a close relationship between awareness and learning.
Delayed Posttest.  The delayed posttest was administered to a subset of the
original 60 who had participated in the first experiment.  It included five learners from
the incidental instruction group, all of whom were, of course, classified as less-aware,
and five learners from the explicit instruction group, two less-aware and three more-
aware.  By asking questions such as What is the highest mountain in the world? and Can
you name any hotels in Waikiki?, the researcher was able to elicit a total of 105 tokens of
place names which take the zero article and 70 place names which take the definite
article.  A complete list of the questions that were used in the delayed posttest is provided
in Appendix C.
There was an extremely strong bias among these 10 learners to use the zero article
with all place names.  There were only three instances of the definite article being used
incorrectly with place names which take the zero article, while there were only five
instances of the definite article being used correctly with place names which take it.  The
zero article was used correctly 102 times and the definite article was used incorrectly 65
times.  Because this bias in favor of no article was so obvious, it was decided that the chi-
square test originally planned was not necessary.  However, looking at who used the
definite article correctly and who used it incorrectly did reveal some interesting
information.
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The definite article was incorrectly used once each by three different learners.  All
three learners were in the explicit instruction group.  Two of them had been classified as
less-aware and one as more-aware.  One less-aware learner incorrectly used the with he
name of a bay, sayingthe Hanauma Bay.  This learner had an awareness level of fourteen,
meaning that the learner just barely failed to be classified as more-aware.  This learner's
posttest score was 64.  This learner misused the definite article on the delayed posttest
even though the question about whether or not to use the wi h bays was correctly
answered on the awareness assessment.  Another less-aware learner incorrectly used the
with a part of a continent, saying the Eastsouth Asia instead of Southeast Asia.  This
learner had an awareness level of eight and a posttest score of 46.  This learner had
incorrectly answered the question about whether or not to use thewi h parts of
continents.  One more-aware learner also incorrectly used the with part of a continent,
saying the Middle Asia instead of Southeast Asia.  This learner's awareness level was 15,
the minimum to be classified as more-aware, with a posttest score of 70.  This learner had
also incorrectly answered the relevant question on the awareness assessment.
The definite article was used correctly once by one more-aware learner in the
explicit instruction group and four times by one less-aware learner in the incidental
instruction group.  The explicit group, more-aware learner used it correctly with a
country name, saying the United States of America.  This learner had an awareness level
of 17 and a posttest score of 54.  The relevant question had been answered correctly on
the awareness assessment.
The most interesting delayed posttest data comes from the less-aware, incidental
group learner who used th  correctly four times.  This learner also used the zero article
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correctly 10 times and failed to use the thr e times.  This learner's awareness level was
13.  This learner had a posttest score of 54, the highest in the incidental group.  This
learner used the correctly in the following contexts:  once with the name of a country (the
United States), once with a region (the East Coast), and twice with the names of hotels
(the Hilton Hawaiian Village, the Hyatt Regency).  This learner failed to use the in the
following contexts:  once with the name of a university, once with the name of a region,
and once with the name of a peninsula.  On the awareness assessment, this learner had
correctly answered the questions about using the with certain country names, with hotels,
and with regions.  While this learner had also answered the question about peninsulas
correctly, the question about using he with names of universities containing of had been
answered incorrectly.  Even though it is not possible to say for sure, this learner seems to
be displaying some long-term learning.  These two learners are further discussed in
Chapter Five.  (See Appendix D for the transcript of the second learner's delayed
posttest.)
In the researcher's opinion, these data about correctly and incorrectly using the
with place names are interesting, but they are also too meager to be used to make any
inferences about long-term effects of the instruction.  All that really can be inferred from
the posttest data is that learners display little or no long-term learning.
Discussion of Experiment One
The eight hypotheses of Experiment One, described above in the Analyses and
Hypotheses section, are repeated here:
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H1:  Learners in both groups will have higher correct scores on the posttest than
on the pretest.
H2:  There will be a significantly greater increase in correct scores on the posttest
compared to the pretest by learners in the explicit instruction group.
H3:  Learners in the explicit instruction group will make fewer errors on novel
items on the posttest than learners in the incidental instruction group.
H4:  A significantly greater number of learners in the explicit instruction group
than in the incidental instruction group will fall into the more-aware learner
group.
H5:  There will be a significantly greater decrease in correct scores on the posttest
compared to the pretest by learners in the more-aware learner group.
H6:  Learners in the more-aware learner group will make fewer errors on novel
items on the posttest than learners in the less-aware learner group.
H7:  Learners in the more-aware learner group will continue to show greater
learning than learners in the less-aware learner group on the delayed posttest.
H8:  Average response times by all learners will be faster on previously
encountered items than on novel items on the posttest.
Hypothesis two was supported.  There was a significantly greater increase in
correct scores by learners in the explicit instruction group.  However, since there was no
significant increase by learners in the incidental instruction group, hypothesis one was
not supported.  Hypothesis three was, in a sense, supported, since learners in the explicit
instruction group outperformed learners in the incidental instruction group on novel
items.  However, since there was no difference between scores on repeated and novel
items for either instruction group, this hypothesis seems, in fact, to have been rendered
irrelevant.  Learners in the explicit instruction group improved on both types of items,
novel and repeated, while learners in the incidental instruction group did not improve on
either type.
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Hypothesis four was supported.  A significantly greater number of learners in the
explicit instruction group were placed into the more-aware learner group.  In fact,
absolutely no learners in the incidental instruction group were placed into the more-aware
learner group.  Hypothesis five was also supported.  Learners in the more-aware learner
group had significantly better posttest scores.  Learners in the less-aware learner group
did not.  Again, since there was no difference in scores for repeated and novel items, with
more-aware learners improving on both and less-aware learners improving on neither,
hypothesis six seems to have been rendered irrelevant.
Hypothesis seven was not supported.  There was little or no long-term learning
found on the delayed posttest by either more-aware or less-aware learners.
Hypothesis eight was not supported.  Average response times dropped for both
instruction groups and for both awareness groups between the pretest and the posttest.
This is possibly due to a desire on the part of the learners to finish the experiment and
collect their five dollars.  Unlike what was found in Robinson (1995a, 1996a, 1996b,
1997a, 1997b), learners displaying less learning did not have significantly lower average
response times, which would have indicated that they were guessing much more than
learners who had learned more.
The implications and limitations of this experiment and of the second experiment
are discussed in Chapter Five.
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Chapter Four
Experiment Two
Introduction
In Experiment One, the amount of input, as measured by number of examples,
was equivalent for both instruction groups.  Each group was exposed to forty examples of
the target feature, with two examples for each rule of thumb.  The explicit instruction
group saw each rule together with one example.  They then saw twenty more examples,
one for each rule.  The incidental instruction group saw each example one time,
embedded in a statement to which they were instructed to decide whether it was true or
false.  Time on task was also roughly equivalent.  However, for learners who attempt to
remember the rules for the use of articles with place names, the incidental instruction
presents a much more difficult challenge since learners must extract the rules from the
input as well as remember them.  Learners receiving explicit instruction, though, needed
only try to remember the rules.
The result was that no learners in the incidental instruction group were classified
as more-aware, though several came close.  In order to compare more-aware and less-
aware learners who have received incidental instruction, it was decided to conduct a
second experiment in which all learners would receive incidental instruction containing a
greater amount of input than in Experiment One.  In addition, it was thought that a second
experiment could present learners with multiple exposure to the same examples, which
may result in a response time effect for repeated items which was not found in the first
experiment.  By increasing the amount of input, the researcher hoped that the more-
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aware/less-aware split observed in the explicit instruction group would also be observed
in a group receiving only incidental instruction.
Because Experiment Two contains only an incidental instruction group, it does
not address research questions one through four, which deal with comparisons between
explicit and incidental instruction.  In addition, Experiment Two does not contain a
delayed posttest, so it does not address research question seven either.  Experiment Two
does address research questions five, six, and eight, which are repeated here and
renumbered (e2 stands for Experiment Two):
1(e2).  Will learners in the more-aware learner group display greater improvement
than learners in the less-aware learner group, as predicted by the noticing
hypothesis and as found in Robinson (1995a, 1997a) and Leow (1997)?
2(e2).  Will learners in the more-aware learner group be better able to generalize
from examples on the pretest and used in instruction to novel items on the
posttest, as measured by error rates?
3(e2).  Will there be differences in response times to previously encountered
items and novel items?
Of course, an important methodological question also needs to be considered.  It
is possible that even with increased input, no learners will be classified as more-aware, or
that there will be so few more-aware learners that it will be impossible to use powerful
statistical tests (MANOVA and ANOVA) to compare the two awareness groups.
A few learners in the incidental instruction group in Experiment One made
comments after the experiment about how they responded to the true/false statements.  A
few mentioned that they had been tricked--they had been instructed to decide whether
statements were true or false, but were then tested on which names took the. A few
others mentioned that they were looking for rules but that it was too difficult to find
91
them.  These comments were made after the experiment was over and were not elicited
by the researcher.  For Experiment Two, the researcher decided that it would be
interesting to ask learners whether or not they had been looking for rules on the use of the
definite article.  If some learners look for rules while others do not, the researcher expects
that those who do look for rules are more likely to be classified as more-aware.  This
leads to a fourth research question:
4(e2):  Will more learners who look for rules be classified as more-aware than
those who do not look for rules?
In Experiment One prior learning was at least partially controlled for by removing
learners who scored too high on the pretest.  Even so, analysis of the pretest results
indicated that prior learning still seemed to be playing a role.  Therefore, it was decided
to remove the easiest items, country names which take the zero article, from Experiment
Two.  Even though pilot testing had revealed that country names which take the zero
article were very easy, country names were retained in Experiment One since the contrast
between country names that take the zero article with those which take the definite article
seemed difficult.  In Experiment Two, both types of country names were removed and
replaced with names of libraries (Hamilton Library) and deserts (he Sahara Desert).  It
was thought that these changes would result in better control for prior learning and would
have the added benefit of having to remove and replace fewer learners.  No other changes
were made to the items used on the pretest and the posttest.  (See Appendix E for the
replacement items.)
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Method
Participants.  Thirty young adult Japanese learners of English as a second
language were recruited from among the same population used in Experiment One.  None
of the learners had participated in Experiment One.  All learners were paid five dollars
for their participation.  Again, in order to control for prior learning, learners who scored
too high on the pretest (52 or higher, above chance at p<.01) were removed from the
study.
Materials.  As in experiment one, all materials were computerized using
PsyScope software (Cohen, et. al, 1993).  Except for the changed items, the pretest and
the practice session used before the pretest were identical to those of Experiment One.
Instruction was similar to the incidental instruction used in Experiment One,
except that the amount of input was increased.  In Experiment One, 40 examples were
presented one time each, while in Experiment Two, each example was presented four
times.  As in Experiment One, learners were presented with statements, one at a time,
containing an example of the target feature.  Learners were instructed to respond to the
statements by deciding if they were true or false.  They then pressed the space bar to learn
the correct answer.  In addition to the 40 statements used in Experiment One, 40
additional statements were also used, each one containing one of the same examples.
After responding to these 80 problems, the learners then answered all 80 true/false
questions a second time.  Learners thus received four times as much input than in
Experiment One, were exposed to each example four times rather than once, and were
exposed to an example of each rule of thumb eight times rather than twice.
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Unlike in Experiment One, instruction was not followed by a distracter task.  It
was removed in order to prevent the experiment from taking too long.  Except for the
changed items, the posttest was also identical to that used in Experiment One.  Again, 40
of the items are items which were used on the pretest and in the instruction, while the
other 40 were novel items.
Assessing learner awareness.  The measure of awareness used in Experiment
Two was almost identical to the measure used in Experiment One, except that learners
were also asked, at the beginning of the interview, whether they had been trying to learn
rules during the instruction.  Also, it was now unimportant whether learners were aware
of rules of thumb for country names.  Instead, they were asked whether they use t  with
the names of libraries and deserts.
In Experiment One, the threshold to be classified as more-aware was 15 correct
answers out of 20, above chance at p<.05.  It was decided that this would be the tentative
criterion used in Experiment Two as well.  However, it was also decided that this level
might be lowered if too few learners reached it.  Lowering the threshold to 14 correct
answers would be above chance at p<.10. Lowering it to 13 correct would be above
chance at p<.25.  (See the Results section for the criterion that was actually adopted.)
Analyses
Answers to the research questions were investigated by testing the following four
hypotheses:
H1(e2):  There will be a significantly greater increase in correct scores on the
posttest compared to the pretest by learners in the more-aware learner group.
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H2(e2):  Learners in the more-aware learner group will make fewer errors on
novel items on the posttest than learners in the less-aware learning group.
H3(e2):  Average response times by all learners will be faster on previously
encountered items than on novel items on the posttest.
H4(e2):  A greater number of learners who look for rules will be classified as
more-aware.
A repeated-measures MANOVA, followed by univariate ANOVAs, was planned
to test the first three hypotheses.  Eta-squared was to test the strength of association of all
significant results.  The relationship between awareness and performance on the  posttest
was also tested through a correlational analysis of the number of correct rules  learners
were able to provide during the debriefing interview and the number correct on the
posttest.  The independent variables for the MANOVA were learner group (more-aware
or less-aware) and item type (repeated or novel).  The dependent variables were correct
score (repeated measure, pretest and posttest) and response time (repeated measure,
pretest and posttest).
Chi-square was used to test the fourth hypothesis.  The variables were whether
learners were looking for rules (yes or no) and learning group (more-aware or less-
aware).
Results
Descriptive statistics of pretest and posttest. The pretest results were somewhat
different from those in Experiment One, indicating that the more difficult test did a better
job of controlling for prior learning.  Three of the original 30 learners were removed and
replaced because they scored too high on the pretest (52 or higher, above chance at
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p<.01).  One of the replacement learners was also removed and replaced.  This means that
34 learners had to be tested in order to gain a usable sample of 30, compared to the 72
learners that had to be tested in Experiment One in order to gain a usable sample of 60.
Descriptive statistics of the pretest also indicate that prior learning was better controlled.
The mean on the pretest was 40.63 out of 80.  The median was 40 and there were two
modes, 39 and 43.  The standard deviation was 4.59.  The low was 30 and the high was
51.  The distribution of pretest scores is displayed graphically in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1:  Pretest Results
Item facility (IF), that is the proportion of learners who answered an item
correctly, was calculated to see which items were already known by the majority of
learners.  The mean IF was 0.51, with a standard deviation of 0.21, a low of 0.17, and a
high of 0.97.  The items with the six highest and seven lowest IFs are displayed in Table
4.1.  As in the pretest in Experiment One, names of single islands were among the easiest.
One of the new items, the Gobi Desert, was one of the most difficult.  Again as in the
pretest in Experiment One, all of the easiest items take the zero article and all of the most
difficult items take the definite article.  To see whether items which take the zero article
Pretest Scores
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were easier, all 80 items were again placed in a rank order scale from one to 80, with one
being the easiest item and 80 the most difficult.  A Mann Whitney U test was then
calculated and the observed z-score was -4.206, significant at p<.01.  There was again a
bias among learners to choose the zero article on the pretest.
Table 4.1:  Items with High and Low IF                                                                                
High IFs          Item                                        Low IFs           Item                                        
0.97 Saipan 0.20 the East Coast
0.97 Tahiti 0.20 the Southeast
0.87 Hanauma Bay 0.20 the Moldive Islands
0.87 Molokai 0.20 the Kahala Mandarin Hotel
0.83 Western Australia 0.17 the Gobi Desert
0.83 San Francisco Bay 0.17 the Northwest
                                                                        0.17                the Marshall Islands               
The mean on the posttest was 45.90.  The median was 43.  The mode was 36, but
was not a good measure of central tendency on the posttest.  The standard deviation was
10.19.  The low score was 34 and the high score was 74.  The distribution of posttest
Figure 4.2:  Posttest Results
scores is displayed graphically in Figure 4.2.  Unlike in Experiment One, there still seems
to be a bias for using the zero article.  The z-score from the Mann Whitney U test was -
3.94, significant at p<.01.
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As in Experiment One, the variances on the pretest and posttest, 21.07 and 103.82
respectively, were quite different.  However, the Fmax ratio, 4.93, was not significant at
p<.01.
Reliability estimates were calculated for both the pretest and the posttest.  These
estimates for the pretest were low, but better than for the pretest in Experiment One.  The
K-R20 reliability estimate for the pretest was 0.2248.  The correlation between the first
and second 40 items was 0.4215, with a full-test consistency of 0.5930.  As in
Experiment One, the posttest reliability estimates were much better.  The K-R20
reliability estimate was 0.8402.  The correlation between the first 40 and second 40 items
was 0.8610, with a full-test consistency of 0.9253.
Comparison of learner groups.  Only four learners reached the tentative
threshold of 15 correct answers to be classified as more-aware.  This was not enough
learners in the more-aware group to carry out powerful nonparametric tests such as
MANOVA and ANOVA (Hatch & Lazaraton, 1991).  In order to get at least five learners
who could be classified as more-aware, the threshold was lowered to 13 correct answers,
above chance at p<.25.  Under this new criterion, seven learners were classified as more-
aware and 23 as less-aware.  Since these groups were extremely unbalanced and the
threshold to be classified as more-aware allowed a large role for chance, the results of the
comparisons between learner groups must, therefore, be interpreted cautiously.
All seven learners who were classified as more-aware stated that they had been
looking for rules.  However, the majority of learners in the experiment stated that they
had been looking for rules.  Only five learners stated that they had not.  This is interesting
in that learners were instructed to respond to meaning, not to look for rules.  In a sense,
98
only five out of 30 learners were following directions.  The awareness levels of learners
who were and were not looking for rules are displayed in Table 4.2.  Looking for rules
seems to be a precondition for being classified as more-aware, but it is not a very good
predictor.  The chi-square comparison of learners who were looking for rules and
classified as more-aware (n=7), were not looking for rules and were classified as more-
aware (n=0), were looking for rules and classified as less-aware (n=18), and were not
looking for rules and classified as less-aware (n=5) did not reveal any significant
differences (chi2=1.8261, not significant at p<.01).  This was probably due to the fact that
the majority of learners were looking for rules but most of them were nevertheless
classified as less-aware.
Table 4.2:  Frequency of Learners Correctly Answering a Given
Number of Awareness Questions                                                       
Correct Answers                   Looking for Rules       Not Looking    
20 0 0
19 1 0
18 2 0
17 0 0
16 0 0
15 1 0
14 0 0
13 3 0
12 3 0
11 5 2
10 6 1
9 2 1
8 1 1
            7                                            1                                0          
Time on task, measured to the minute, was longer than it was in Experiment One,
which is not surprising since the learners received four times as much input in
Experiment Two.  The median time was 30.5 minutes, with a minimum of 20 minutes
and a maximum of 51 minutes.
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A repeated-measures MANOVA comparison of awareness groups indicated that
there were significant differences between pretest and posttest scores (Wilks'
Lambda=0.532, p=.0001), a significant interaction between awareness group and test
scores (Wilks' Lambda=0.660, p=. 001), and between pretest and posttest response times
(Wilks' Lambda=0.469, p=.0001).  Significant effects were not found for any interaction
between test scores and item type (repeated versus novel) (p=.3947) or for any interaction
between test scores, awareness group, and item type (p=.3947).  Nor were significant
effects found for any interaction between awareness group and response time (p=.5558),
between response time and item type (p=.1995), or between response time, awareness
group, and item type (p=.6132).  These results mirror the comparisons made between
learner groups in Experiment One.
The pretest and posttest mean scores and standard deviations and mean response
times and standard deviations for each learner group are shown in Table 4.3.  The results
of follow-up repeated-measures ANOVAs are shown in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.  Finally,
Table 4.6 gives the strengths of association, eta square for repeated measures, of
significant ANOVA effects.
As can be seen in Table 4.3, the more-aware group mean score and the less-aware
group mean score were almost the same on the pretest.  However, the posttest mean of
the more-aware group was much higher while that of the less-aware group was almost
unchanged.  The ANOVA results indicate that the differences between the posttest scores
of the more-aware group and the other test scores were significant.  These are the same
results as were found in Experiment One.  As can be seen in Table 4.6, the group effect
100
accounted for 21.8% of the variance in the score data and the test by group interaction
accounted for 11.2%.
Table 4.3:  Mean Scores and Response Times of Learner Groups                                         
Test                Group              Mean Score     sd                     Mean RT         sd                     
Pretest More 42.714 3.773 5632.361 1458.317
Pretest Less 40.000 4.700 4652.466 2048.633
Posttest More 58.429 12.765 3560.800 421.411
Posttest            Less                42.087             5.222               2867.777         1108.835         
Eighty is the highest possible score.  Latencies are averaged across items and then across
learners; given in milliseconds.
Table 4.4:  Repeated-Measures ANOVA Comparison of Scores and Learner Groups          
Source                                     df         Sum of Sq.       Mean Sq.         F-value            p          
Group 1 974.392 974.392 18.955 .0002*
Subject 28 1439.342 51.405
Test 1 850.306 850.306 33.551 .0001*
Test * Group 1 498.306 498.306 19.662 .0001*
Test * Subject                         28        709.627           25.344                                                 
dependent variable:  score; *significant at p<.01
Table 4.5:  Repeated-Measures ANOVA Comparison of RTs and Learner Groups            
Source                                     df         Sum of Sq.       Mean Sq.         F-value            p          
Group 1 7,509,726 7,509,726 2.091 .1592
Subject 28 100,500,0003,590,641
Test 1 39,902,945 39,902,945 34.200 .0001*
Test * Group 1 220,826 220,826 .189 .6669
Test * Subject                         28        32,668,834      1,166,744                                          
dependent variable:  response time; *significant at p<.01
Table 4.6:  Eta Squared for Significant Effects                                                                    
Effect                                      SS Effect         Re        SS Total                    Eta Square        
Group (score) 974.392 4471.973 .218
Test (score) 850.306 4471.973 .190
Test * Group (score) 498.306 4471.973 .112
Test (response time)                39,902,945                 180,802,331               .221                
Eta Squared equals SS Effect divided by SS Total
The only significant change in the response time data was between the pretest and
the posttest.  As in Experiment One, learners responded to items more quickly on the
posttest regardless of learner group.
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For the most part, correlations between learners' pretest and posttest scores and
awareness levels supported the results of the comparisons reported above.  The
correlation between posttest scores and awareness levels was 0.8839, significant at p<.01.
This was a strong correlation, and r2 was 0.7812.  However, the correlation between
pretest scores and awareness levels, 0.4335, was also significant at p<.01.  While this
correlation was significant, it was much lower than the correlation between posttest
scores and awareness levels.  It was also not a very strong correlation, with r2 of only
0.1879.  It indicates, though, that learners who achieved higher awareness levels did have
an initial advantage.
Discussion of Experiment Two
The four hypotheses investigated in Experiment Two, reported above, are
repeated here:
H1(e2):  There will be a significantly greater increase in correct scores on the
posttest compared to the pretest by learners in the more-aware learner group.
H2(e2):  Learners in the more-aware learner group will make fewer errors on
novel items on the posttest than learners in the less-aware learning group.
H3(e2):  Average response times by all learners will be faster on previously
encountered items than on novel items on the posttest.
H4(e2):  A greater number of learners who look for rules will be classified as
more-aware.
Hypothesis one was supported.  More-aware learners showed improvement on the
posttest while less-aware learners did not.  As in Experiment One, there were no effects
related to item type, either for correct scores or for response times.  Since more-aware
learners did better on novel items than less-aware learners, hypothesis two was, in a
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sense, supported, but the lack of differences between item types seems, again, to have
rendered this hypothesis irrelevant.  More-aware learners improved on all items
regardless of type, while less-aware learners showed improvement on neither type.
Hypotheses three was not supported in any sense, a somewhat surprising result given the
number of exposures to each repeated item in this experiment.  Surprisingly, hypothesis
four was also not supported, even though only learners who were looking for rules were
classified as more-aware.  This is probably because looking for rules was a precondition
for becoming aware, but it was not a predictor of becoming aware.
As hoped, increasing the input helped bring about a more-aware/less-aware split
among learners receiving only incidental instruction.  However, in order to have a large
enough more-aware learner group, the awareness threshold had to be lowered.  Increasing
the amount of input did not seem to have any effect on response times to repeated
instances.
The next chapter contains an in-depth discussion of the results of both
experiments.
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Chapter Five
Discussion
Introduction
Laboratory research on SLA has implications for SLA theory and research and for
second and foreign language pedagogy.  There are also limits to what such research in
general can teach us, as well as specific limitations of any given study.  This chapter
discusses the results of Experiments One and Two with regard to the relationship
between instruction, awareness and learning; incidental versus intentional learning;
instance-based learning; long-term learning; and the choice of definite or zero article.
Also discussed are the limitations of this study and its implications for theory, research,
and pedagogy.
General Discussion of Experiments One and Two
Instruction condition, awareness, and learning.  The idea for this study was
conceived while the researcher was looking into a variety of effects of instruction studies,
such as those reviewed in the second chapter.  In some of these studies, it seems to be
assumed that learning processes and the accompanying learner awareness are determined
solely by the type of instruction that they receive, as if explicit instruction guarantees
learner awareness of rules and instruction without an explicit component precludes it.
For example, in Winitz (1996), it is assumed that so-called explicit and implicit
instruction necessarily result in explicit and implicit learning processes, respectively.  In
this study, the researcher wished not only to look at learning under different instruction
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conditions, but also to look at the development of awareness under the different
conditions and the relationship between awareness and improved performance.
It was expected that awareness would develop under both the explicit and
incidental instruction conditions in this study, with the explicit instruction being more
facilitative of awareness and thus resulting in more learners who could be classified as
more-aware.  It was also expected that there would be variability among the learners
regardless of instruction condition, with less-aware and more-aware learners in both
instruction groups.  Since a certain level of awareness has been argued to be necessary for
learning (Schmidt, 1990, 1993, 1994b, 1995), it was expected that learners classified as
more-aware would outperform those classified as less-aware.  And, since explicit
instruction is likely to facilitate awareness, it was expected that the explicit instruction
group would outperform the incidental instruction group.  To a certain extent, these
expectations were fulfilled.  The expected split between more-aware and less-aware
learners within a single instruction condition was found in the explicit instruction group
of Experiment One.  About two-thirds of the learners were classified as more-aware and
the rest as less-aware.  In addition, there was a great deal of variability in the awareness
of learners in this group, as measured by the number of correct answers on the debriefing
questionnaires (see Table 3.6).  Indeed, the one learner who correctly answered the least
number of questions on the questionnaire, seven, was in this instruction group.  This
shows that it cannot be assumed that learners who receive some kind of explicit
instruction necessarily develop awareness of the targets of instruction.  Instead, explicit
instruction may facilitate awareness, but this will vary from learner to learner.
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There was also, as expected, variability in awareness among learners in the
incidental instruction groups in both experiments.  However, for the most part, the
expected split between more-aware and less-aware learners did not materialize.  In
Experiment One, several learners came close to the threshold for being classified as
more-aware, but no learners actually reached it (see Table 3.6).  The researcher then
thought that, if the amount of input were increased, some learners in this group would be
able to reach the threshold and a more-aware versus less-aware split would appear as in
the explicit instruction group.  Therefore, Experiment Two, in which all learners were
placed in the incidental instruction condition, was designed, with four times as much
exposure as in Experiment One.  However, in this experiment also, there was not much of
a split, with only four learners reaching the original threshold to be classified as more-
aware.  Even after the threshold was lowered to 13 correct answers, above chance at
p<.25, only seven learners were classified as more-aware.  Given that the learners in this
experiment saw two examples per rule four times each, and that the majority of learners
claimed to have been looking for rules on the use of , it is rather surprising that they
did not do any better.  Some possible reasons that they could not learn any better are
discussed below.
As expected, the learners in the explicit instruction group outperformed those in
the incidental instruction group.  In fact, the incidental group learners in Experiment One
showed no improvement at all.  This reflects the fact that explicit instruction was much
more facilitative of awareness.  Also as expected, there was a very close relationship
between awareness and learning.  Not only did the more-aware learners outperform the
less-aware learners in Experiment One, but there were also strong correlations between
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level of awareness, as measured by the number of correct answers on the debriefing
questionnaire, and posttest scores in both experiments.  In fact, the strength of the
correlation in Experiment One was such that the researcher was prompted to calculate the
correlation between pretest scores and awareness levels in order to make sure that prior
knowledge was not contaminating the data.  Even though this correlation was positive, it
was not significant and thus cannot be said not to be the result of chance.  Even if a type
two error has been made, and there actually is a real correlation between pretest scores
and awareness levels, the small size of the correlation means that it cannot be a very
important factor.  There was, though, a significant positive correlation between pretest
scores and awareness levels in Experiment Two, indicating that more-aware learners
began the experiment with an advantage.  However, in contrast to the correlation between
posttest scores and awareness levels, this correlation is not very strong.  Of course, in
Experiment One, the results of the comparisons of the instruction groups and of the
learner groups are reflections of each other, with the more-aware group in fact being the
explicit instruction group minus those learners who apparently did not benefit much from
the explicit instruction.  In addition, if learning is directly related to awareness, then it
could be said that the posttest, which measured learning, and the debriefing, which
measured awareness of rules of thumb, were measuring essentially the same thing.
As in Leow (1997) and Robinson (1995a, 1996a, 1996b, 1997a), the empirical
evidence found in this study supports Schmidt's noticing hypothesis in that there was
more learning with more awareness.  However, the fact that there was a strong
relationship between awareness and learning does not uniquely support the idea that
awareness is necessary for SLA.  It could be, for instance, that the posttest implicates
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only metalinguistic knowledge.  Truscott (1998a) argues that this is a problem with all
empirical studies of noticing and that no studies have shown that noticing is necessary for
the acquisition of linguistic competence.  It could also be that detection, which does not
require awareness but often occurs in conjunction with it, is responsible for the improved
performance of the more-aware learners (Tomlin & Villa, 1994).  The more-aware
learners could be more successful because awareness facilitated detection or detection
started cognitive processes which brought about awareness, and thus there is a correlation
between more-aware learners and learners who had detected enough to display learning.
This study has not been designed to separate empirically detection and awareness, and
designing an SLA study which could investigate whether learning can take place with
detection but without awareness seems to be a practical impossibility, at least at the
present time.
This study also provides some evidence against models of learning without
awareness (Krashen, 1981, 1982, 1994; Paradis, 1994), although it does not disprove
those models.  In Krashen’s model, for example, unconscious acquisition occurs when
input just beyond a learner’s current level (input at i+1) is somehow comprehended by
the learner and the learner is in an affective state that allows this input to enter the
learner’s interlanguage system (low affective filter).    It is impossible to prove that the
target feature of this study was at the i+1 lev l for the less successful learners or that the
less successful learners had low affective filters.  However, the use of place names was
something which the learners had not yet acquired and the input in the incidental
condition seems to have been comprehensible to the learners.  It is likely that the target
feature was at the i+1 level for at least some of the learners.  In addition, while computer
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anxiety may have caused some learners to raise their affective filters, the researcher was
friendly to all the learners, who seemed eager to help and happy to receive five dollars for
less than an hour's work.  It is therefore reasonable to expect that the majority of learners
did not have high affective filters.  Also, since in Experiment One all learners were
randomly assigned to instruction groups, it is unlikely that two-thirds of the learners in
the explicit instruction group were ready to acquire the target feature and had low
affective filters while this was true for no one in the incidental instruction group.  It may
be that Krashen’s model is unfalsifiable, and in the absence of empirical evidence that
SLA can occur without awareness, perhaps the burden of proof should be on those who
claim it does (c.f., DeKeyser, 1994).
Incidental versus intentional learning.  As explained in Chapters One and Three,
the incidental condition is called an incidental instructioncondition rather than an
incidental learning condition since learners may choose an intentional strategy.  It should
not have been difficult for any of the learners to realize that the study was about using
the--the pretest should have alerted them to this.  While in Experiment One learners were
not asked whether they had been looking for rules, they were asked this in Experiment
Two and the majority answered that they had.  In spite of the fact that learners were only
instructed to decide whether statements were true or false, and thus to respond to
meaning, the majority, 25 out of 30, chose to focus on the use of theas well.  Even
though looking for rules was not predictive of being more-aware, all the learners who
were classified as more-aware in Experiment Two were part of this majority.  It seems
safe to say that any learning which happened in this condition was more intentional than
incidental.  It is even safe to say that the majority of learners who did not show any
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improvement were also trying to learn intentionally.  Since learning in the incidental
instruction condition was not actually incidental, learning in this condition will be
discussed in the next subsection.
Instance-based learning.   Even though no effect for response time between
novel and repeated items was found in the study, instance-based learning, or data-based
processing as it is called by Robinson (1995b), does seem to have played a role for at
least some learners, something which is especially evident in Experiment Two.  As
explained above, learning in the incidental instruction condition was most likely
intentional rather than incidental.  However, since learners were provided only with
examples, not with rules, learning in this instruction group was almost certainly instance-
based rather than rule-based.  (Since the explicit instruction contained both rules and
examples, learning may have been rule-based, instance-based, or both.)  While no
incidental instruction group learners in Experiment One reached the threshold to be
classified as more-aware, several of them did come close to reaching that threshold,
indicating that they may have been able to become aware of at least some of the rules of
thumb based on the data alone.  In addition, four learners in Experiment Two reached the
original threshold and seven reached the lowered threshold to be classified as more-
aware.  On the other hand, the incidental instruction provided in both Experiments One
and Two seems to have benefited other learners, the majority, not at all.
The lack of effect for response time is probably due to the interaction of a number
of factors.  First, there may not have been enough exposure to each instance, even in
Experiment Two, for direct retrieval of an instance to be noticeably faster than
application of a rule.  While Logan (1990) argues that automaticity and repetition priming
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are both based on direct instance retrieval, and there can thus be decreased response time
in recognition with even just one prior exposure, this does not seem to have applied in
this study, in which learners were asked to make a correct choice rather than to decide,
for example, whether a string of letters was a word or nonword.  Second, instead of
pressing a button as soon as an instance had been retrieved from memory, learners may
have continued to think about their choices on the posttest even after retrieving an
appropriate instance.  Their response times only show how long learners took to answer
the items, and thus only indirectly how long it took to retrieve the relevant information
from memory.  Third, the overall decrease in response times between the pretest and
posttest, possibly reflecting learners' desire to finish, would have obscured any very small
response time effects that may have occurred.  For example, in Logan (1990) decreases in
response times after between two and 10 presentations were less than 200 milliseconds.
One more factor may have also worked against faster responses to repeated versus
novel items.  As described in Chapter One, similarity between repeated items and novel
items can effect response times on novel items.  Palmeri (1997) found that the degree of
similarity between exemplars and novel items was related to response times, with a
higher degree of similarity resulting in a quicker response time.  Unlike in Palmeri, it is
not possible to calculate the degree of similarity between repeated and novel items in this
study, such as the Nile River ( epeated) and the Amazon River (novel).  However, there
are 20 categories of place names in this study, each of which has both repeated and novel
items, and it is likely that items in the same category are similar enough for this to affect
the time needed to make judgements on the posttest.
111
That some learners but not others were able to learn something directly from the
instances is demonstrated by the results of Experiment Two.  Even though all learners
were exposed to the forty examples, two for each rule, four times each, only four learners
reached the original threshold to be classified as more-aware.  These four learners had
higher posttest scores than any other learners in the experiment.  Since the researcher was
unable to make MANOVA comparisons due to the small number of more-aware learners,
it was decided to lower the threshold to be classified as more-aware.  Even so, only seven
learners were so classified.  While it was pointed out that the results of Experiment Two
need to be treated cautiously, the comparisons of more-aware and less-aware learners
indicate that only the few more-aware learners learned anything.  In contrast, even with
the lowered threshold, twenty-three learners were still unable to gain enough rule
awareness to be classified as more-aware, despite the fact that the majority of learners
stated that they had been looking for rules on the use of the, and these learners did not
show measurable improvement on the posttest.  Of course, it should be noted again that
reaching the original more-aware threshold in Experiment Two actually required more
work than it did in Experiment One, since removing country names and replacing them
with names of deserts and libraries had the effect of raising that threshold.
As discussed in Chapter One, theoretical proposals bringing instance-based
learning into SLA have been made by Robinson (1995b), who calls it data-based
processing, and Truscott (1998b).  Truscott's proposal involves recasting the
acquisition/learning distinction in terms of learning being the development of algorithms
and acquisition the accumulation of instances.  While Truscott does not actually mention
whether awareness is involved, seeing the accumulation of instances in these terms
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implies that it occurs in the absence of awareness.  Robinson, though, argues that
awareness plays a role in both data-based processing (instance-based learning) and
conceptually-based processing (rule-based learning).  The close relationship between
successful instance-based learning and awareness found in Experiment Two supports
Robinson's position.
It may be surprising that the incidental instruction groups, especially in
Experiment Two, did not do any better.  According to Krashen (1994), learners can
achieve a high level of competence in a second language with only comprehensible input
and without receiving explicit instruction.  Indeed, that naturalistic second language
learners can develop a high level of communicative competence can be seen in the case
studies of naturalistic learners conducted by Schmidt (1983) and Klein (1986), which
provide empirical evidence that learners can learn directly from the input and achieve a
high level of communicative competence without explicit instruction.  Through incidental
learning, they can, for example, gain the ability to make themselves understood in the
target language, to understand other users of the target language, and to behave in
pragmatically appropriate ways.  However, what seems more difficult is for the learners
in these studies to develop target-like usage of the morphology and syntax of the second
language directly from the input, even after long periods of contact and interaction.  One
Spanish migrant to Germany, for instance, is described by Klein as having "no inflection
whatever at his disposal," but is nevertheless "a skilled story-teller" (p. 126).
In Experiment Two of this study, the majority of learners claimed to have been
looking for rules but either failed to find them or misinterpreted them.  While Krashen
(1994) claims that the grammar of natural languages is too complex to be explicitly
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taught, it may in fact be that it is too complex to be learned directly from the input, at
least by the majority of learners.  Klein (1986) divides the learner's task into four
problems, one of which is the problem of analysis, or figuring out the rules, with or
without awareness, of the target language.  It is possible that when it comes to the formal
features of the target language, such as the arbitrary use of the definite article with certain
categories of place names in English, this problem of analysis is especially difficult.  It
may be that only very few learners are capable of figuring out the grammar of a second
language on their own and that the majority of learners actually require the facilitative aid
of explicit instruction in order to become aware of some formal features.
One Experiment Two learner in particular demonstrates the ability of learners not
to learn anything through instance-based learning.  Like most learners, this learner
claimed to have been looking for rules on the use of . However, on the debriefing
questionnaire, this learner answered that all item categories do not take the, resulting in
an awareness level of ten.  A look at this learner's pretest scores reveals that the zero
article was chosen for each item.  On the posttest, the zero article was chosen for all but
two items, for both of which the definite article was chosen incorrectly, making this
learner's posttest score, thirty-eight, lower than the pretest score of forty.  (This learner
took 36 minutes to complete the experiment, above the median time of 30.5 minutes,
indicating that a strategy of just pressing buttons to get through the experiment was not
employed.)  It may be said that this use of the definite article was not at the i+1 level, so
the learner was unable to learn anything, or it may be said that the input was not
comprehensible or that the learner's affective filter was high.  However, the researcher
knows this learner personally.  This learner is married to someone who speaks a standard
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outer circle dialect of English (Kachru & Nelson, 1996) and does not speak Japanese.  All
communication between spouses is in English.  The learner is communicatively fluent
and has a high level of comprehension in both oral and written modalities.  It is highly
unlikely that the input was not comprehensible.  Also, it seems to the researcher that this
learner is as or more proficient than those learners who did learn something, so it seems
strange that this use of articles would be above i+1.  Finally, the learner does not seem at
all to be intimidated by or to dislike either computers or the researcher, so it would also
be strange to say that the learner had a high affective filter.  Still, the learner apparently
learned nothing from the input.  According to Klein (1986), another of the four problems
faced by learners is the problem of matching, or figuring out how the learner's variety of
the language is different from the norms of the target language.  This matching problem
actually becomes more difficult as the learner becomes more proficient, since the
learner's language more closely approximates the target, and the learner is more certain of
the accuracy of the language rules he or she has.  Perhaps this learner, as well as some of
the other unsuccessful learners, was extremely confident that all place names take the
zero article, and therefore did not notice any discrepancy between the input and this
learner's own rules.  In addition, the arbitrary and apparently meaningless nature of this
use of the may have made it more difficult to notice this discrepancy.
While this study found evidence supporting a role for instance-based learning in
SLA and for a relationship between instance-based learning and awareness, it is difficult
to explain the differences found among learners.  Again, the majority of learners in
Experiment Two claimed to have been looking for rules, but did not find them.  This
failure does not seem to be related to proficiency.  It is this researcher's subjective
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opinion that the successful learners were among the more proficient, but that there were
also less successful learners of equal or greater proficiency, such as the one described
above.  It is also difficult to say exactly what learners, particularly the more successful
learners, were actually doing.  Were they memorizing examples and then using the
examples they had memorized to answer the items on the posttest, either through direct
retrieval of or analogy to an example, and only constructing rules when they were asked
for them during the debriefing?  Or were they actively constructing rules of thumb as
they encountered the examples?  Or were some learners using one strategy and others the
other strategy?  Unfortunately, the answers to such questions cannot be found in the
results of this study.
Long-term learning.  Little evidence of any long-term learning was found among
the subset of ten learners who had participated in the first experiment and took the
delayed posttest.  Only two learners used the definite article correctly on the delayed
posttest, and both of these learners also produced tokens which should have had the
definite article but did not.  In addition, it is difficult to determine whether their
performance on the posttest can be tied to something they had learned during the
experiment.  In fact, the more-aware learner from the explicit instruction group who
produced one correct token marked with the definite article, the Uni ed States of America,
had answered all four items of this category correctly on both the pretest and the posttest,
including the pretest item, the United States.  It is possible that the explicit instruction
this learner received during the experiment reinforced this learner's control over this use
of the definite article, but there is no way to prove this one way or the other.
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For the less-aware learner from the incidental instruction group who produced
four correct tokens marked with the definite article, the results are somewhat more
supportive that some long-learning has taken place.  The learner got one of these tokens,
the United States, correct on the pretest.  However, only one other of the four items of
this category was answered correctly on the pretest.  On the posttest, where the United
States was not an item, this learner answered three of the four items of this category
correctly.  Another item that this learner produced correctly on the delayed posttest, th
East Coast, was answered incorrectly on the pretest but correctly on the posttest.  In
addition, this learner only answered one item of this category correctly on the pretest, but
answered three of four correctly on the posttest.  The other two tokens that this learner
produced correctly on the delayed posttest were names of hotels, th  Hilton Hawaiian
Village and the Hyatt Regency.  On the pretest, this learner correctly answered one of the
four items of this category.  The correctly answered item was the Hilton Hotel.  This
learner correctly answered three of the four items of this correctly on the posttest,
including the Hilton Hotel.  (The Hyatt Regency was not an item on either the pretest or
posttest.)  It must be remembered that, while not classified as more-aware, this learner
had a higher level of awareness than most other learners in the incidental instruction
group of Experiment One.  Again, though, it cannot be proven that this learner's delayed
posttest performance is tied to learning which took place during the experiment, but this
is certainly a more likely possibility than for the other learner.
It is rather disappointing, but hardly surprising, that there was not more evidence
of long-term learning on the delayed posttest.  One short instruction session cannot be
expected to have a very strong long-term influence on learners' productive abilities.  In
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order for long-term learning actually to have taken place, learners would probably have
had to receive further relevant input during the period between the experiment and the
delayed posttest.  In addition, since the delayed posttest required learners to produce
rather than just choose the correct form, learners would also probably have needed some
relevant production practice during this interval.  The researcher has no way of knowing
whether the learners had relevant input or practice, but it seems likely that they did not
have much.
Zero article or no article?  One rather implausible way of viewing the English
article system is that it consists of three articles:  the indefinite article (a/a ), the definite
article (the), and the zero article (no surface form).  Even though under most conditions
the choice would not be conscious, one of these three articles would have to be chosen
every time a noun phrase were produced.  The indefinite article would be chosen when
the noun phrase did not contain any other determiner and referred to something
unspecified and singular.  The definite article would be chosen when the noun phrase did
not contain any other determiner and referred to something either specified in the
discourse or specific by context or by nature.  The definite article would also be chosen
with certain proper nouns, including certain place names, or when specifying one of
several identical proper nouns (e.g., the Eric who is married to Mariko).  The zero article
would be chosen when there were another determiner, when the noun phrase referred to
something not specified and either plural or mass, and with certain proper names, again
including certain place names.  (Of course, in most cases, rather than choosing the
definite or zero article each time they produced a proper noun, fluent speakers would just
retrieve the proper noun with the correct article attached directly from memory.)
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However, speakers of English who did not have a target-like article system, a
group which includes the majority of Japanese speakers of English as a second language,
would probably not make this choice when producing noun phrases in English.  The
rank-order statistical tests of the ease of the test items described in the last two chapters
indicate that items which take the zero article were easier on the pretests in both
experiments and on the posttest in Experiment Two.  In addition, on the delayed posttest
in Experiment One, tokens which take the zero article were rarely marked incorrectly
with the definite article, while tokens which take the definite article were rarely marked
correctly.  This does not indicate, though, a preference on the part of learners for
choosing the zero article over the definite article.  Rather, the learners were most likely
not making any choice between the three articles.  Since a noun phrase with no article, if
it were target-like in all other respects, would be identical to a noun phrase marked with
the zero article, learners who did not make a choice of article would appear to display a
preference for choosing the zero article.
At the beginning of this subsection, it was noted that this way of viewing the
English article system is not very plausible.  The reason is that it is extremely unlikely
that noun phrases without either the indefinite or definite article are actually marked with
a zero article which does not have any surface form.  This implausible scenario was
described above in order to illustrate that what most learners were probably doing was
not incorrectly not choosing the definite article, but, rather, not making any choice at all.
It would be interesting to see whether there are learners with a fairly target-like
article system who nevertheless do not use the definite article with place names which
take it, and whether such learners would be better able to learn this use of articles directly
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from input, without the facilitative aid of explicit instruction.  Unfortunately, though,
even if such learners exist finding them would be extremely difficult.
Limitations
The major limitation of this study is its low external validity.  Laboratory studies
of SLA, such as this one, can achieve a higher degree of control than can classroom
studies or studies of naturalistic language learners over such variables as prior learning
and language exposure outside the classroom or laboratory, but such control is achieved
at the sacrifice of some generalizability to non-laboratory contexts.  Both the explicit
instruction and the incidental instruction used in this study are rather different than
instruction which is likely to take place in foreign or second language classrooms.  This
difference limits the extent to which the findings of this study can generalize to language
classrooms.  The input in the incidental instruction condition is also different from input
likely to be encountered during naturalistic language learning, again limiting its
generalizability.
Though it does not necessarily happen in the absence of awareness, incidental
learning takes place when learners intend to communicate and are focused on meaning.
When, or if, it takes place in language classrooms, it occurs when learners are interacting
in the target language, with other learners, teachers, or texts.  For example, incidental
acquisition of vocabulary seems likely to take place when learners are trying to
understand the meaning of a written text.  In this study, incidental instruction is
operationalized by asking learners to respond to statements which are either true or false,
with each statement containing exactly one example of the learning target.  It is quite
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easy for learners to adopt an intentional learning strategy, even though it is much more
difficult to use this strategy successfully.  It seems unlikely that the incidental instruction
in this study is similar to the type of interaction that normally takes place in language
classrooms.
Incidental learning also occurs in naturalistic language learning.  In classrooms,
materials may be developed to promote incidental learning, but this does not happen in
naturalistic learning, where learners have to learn what they can from environmental
input while trying to interact.  Incidental instruction as operationalized in this study, with
examples neatly packed into the input, is thus even more different from naturalistic
incidental learning than from any incidental learning which is likely to occur in
classrooms.
It may seem at first that the explicit instruction is fairly similar to the kind of
explicit instruction which is likely to take place in language classrooms.  However, there
are also important differences between the way explicit instruction is operationalized in
this study and the way it occurs in classrooms.  In this study, explicit instruction is
operationalized as the provision of 20 rules of thumb and two examples of each rule.
Learners do not practice applying the rules themselves, except on the posttest.  Explicit
classroom instruction also involves the provision of pedagogical rules and, most likely,
examples as well.  However, it seems unlikely that explicit classroom instruction would
not involve practice applying the rules.  In addition, in communicatively-oriented
classrooms, any explicit instruction would also involve communicative interaction with
other language users or texts.  Such interaction is not included in this study.
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Even though differences between the explicit and incidental instruction as
operationalized in this study and the instruction and learning which is likely to take place
outside the laboratory limit the extent to which the findings of this study can be
generalized to other situations, this does not mean that this study, as well as other
laboratory studies, teaches us nothing about how languages are actually learned.  In
particular, since acquisition in this study is superior for more-aware learners, this
indicates that awareness is important in SLA and provides some evidence that it plays a
causal role.  Since awareness is important for acquisition in this study, it is likely that it is
also important in SLA occurring in other contexts as well.
Another possible limitation is that the instruction in this study, either explicit or
incidental, could be argued to take place over a much shorter time span than instruction in
a classroom.  However, while learners generally took less time to complete the
experiment than the fifty to sixty minutes of instruction typical in a language classroom,
they were on task for the duration of the experiment.  This is in contrast to what often
happens in the language classroom, where learners are typically on task for only a
fraction of the class time.
Another limitation of this study is that it does not look at the development of
fluency in a second language.  Second language acquisition is not just the acquisition of
features of the second language.  It is also the development of the ability to produce and
comprehend language containing those features automatically, without having to devote a
great deal of attentional resources.  Fluency can only be developed through practice using
the language.  For example, according to Anderson's ACT theory (1983, 1993; Anderson
& Lebiere, 1998), skill acquisition, including language acquisition, requires practice for
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the proceduralization of declarative knowledge and for the strengthening of learned
productions.  Turning to a model designed to apply specifically to language acquisition,
in Bialystok's two-dimensional model of language acquisition (1994; Bialystok &
Sharwood Smith, 1985), one dimension is the development of control of processing, that
is, the ability to devote attentional resources efficiently.  The development of second
language fluency requires development along this dimension.  However, other than
looking at learners' response times in making their choices, this study is not really
concerned with the development of second language fluency.  Rather, it is concerned
with the role of awareness in the acquisition of new second language features and in the
conversion of input to intake.  It was decided that the development of fluency was outside
the scope of this paper and that it would have been impractical to study it with the
number of learners involved.
A third limitation involves prior learning and the extent to which it was
controlled.  Extensive prior learning was indeed controlled by removing and replacing
learners who had scored too high on the pretest.  However, the pretest scores in
Experiment One indicate that prior learning was still probably exerting an influence.
Still, the low correlation between awareness levels and pretest scores in Experiment One
indicates that this influence was not great.  Things are somewhat more confused in
Experiment Two.  Based on the descriptive statistics of the pretest, prior learning seemed
to be playing less of a role than in Experiment One.  However, there was also a
significant, if weak, correlation between pretest scores and awareness levels.  When a
study involves English, or other widely-studied natural languages, prior learning can only
be controlled to a certain extent.
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A final limitation of this study is that the pretest and posttest are a kind of
grammaticality judgement test.  Such tests may tap true linguistic competence, or they
may only test learners' metalinguistic knowledge.  Truscott (1998a) argues that studies of
noticing do not provide evidence for the role of noticing in SLA since the tests used to
measure acquisition may merely be tapping metalinguistic knowledge.
Implications
Keeping the limitations discussed above in mind, this study has implications for
SLA research, SLA theory, and foreign and second language pedagogy.  This final
section discusses the implications of this study based on the results from Experiments
One and Two discussed above.
Pedagogical implications.  Most likely, the main benefit of explicit instruction is
that it may facilitate noticing, and thus help in converting input to intake (Schmidt, 1995).
It may also be that, for some learners, this help is not optional, it is required.  However,
since only some of the learners receiving explicit instruction in this study display a high
level of awareness, this indicates that learners receiving equivalent amounts of explicit
instruction in a classroom will nevertheless develop varying levels of awareness.
Because of these differences, the facilitative effect of explicit classroom instruction will
vary among learners.  In addition, since learners receiving incidental instruction in this
study also vary in their awareness, this indicates variability among learners in the
effectiveness of classroom instruction intended to promote incidental learning.  The main
pedagogical implication of this study is that learners need to be given multiple
opportunities, through a variety of instructional techniques, to develop awareness of
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features of the language.  This implication is hardly earth-shattering, but it nevertheless
needs to be remembered.
Implications for SLA research and theory.  One implication for SLA research
comes from the rather uninteresting fact that learners responded to items more quickly on
the posttest than on the pretest.  This result seems to be uninteresting from a theoretical
point of view--the learners may just have wanted to complete the experiment.  However,
it is important from a methodological point of view.  The pretest and posttest were rather
long, containing 80 items each.  Since the items were presented in a different random
order to each learner, the desire to finish should not have caused response time
differences between items within the same test.  However, had the study employed tests
in which items were not presented randomly, such as paper and pencil tests, there
probably would have been shorter response times for later items.  Researchers employing
pretests and posttests in empirical studies of SLA need to keep in mind the potential
influence of learner fatigue on the test results.
Another implication for SLA research is that researchers cannot provide learners
with a certain kind of instruction and assume that it determines the learning processes that
learners will use.  For example, a hypothetical study which compared explicit instruction,
input enhancement, and mere exposure may provide information about the effectiveness
of these different approaches to instruction, and the explicit instruction and input
enhancement may actually facilitate awareness.  However, without an independent
measure of awareness, such a study could not be claimed to be a study of the effects of
awareness on learning.  Similarly, demonstrations of learning without any explicit
instruction should not be taken as evidence for learning without awareness.  In addition,
125
while it is not too difficult to develop a measure to assess different levels of awareness,
researchers should recognize the methodological difficulty of establishing that learners
are completely lacking in awareness.  Unlike the measure used in this study, or in studies
such as Robinson (1995a, 1996a, 1996b, 1997a) and Leow(1997), a measure capable of
identifying zero-level awareness would need to meet completely the criteria of Shanks
and St. John (1994) discussed in Chapter One.
Even though it is possible that the relationship found in this study between
awareness and learning was not a causal relationship, by finding more learning among
more-aware learners, the results support the argument that some level of awareness is
necessary for learning, at least for those aspects of a second language which fall outside
the scope of UG.  The implication for SLA theory should be clear.  If awareness does
play a role in SLA, then theoretical models of SLA must take the role of awareness into
account.  Since this study, especially Experiment Two, finds a role for instance-based
learning, this indicates that accumulation of instances should also be taken in to account
in an SLA theory.  Since the roles of awareness and instance accumulation in learning
have mostly been investigated in the field of cognitive psychology, SLA theorists need to
draw on theories and empirical evidence from cognitive psychology.  This has, of course,
already been done for some theoretical positions in SLA, such as the noticing hypothesis
(Schmidt, 1990, 1993, 1994b, 1995; Robinson, 1995b), the fundamental similarity
hypothesis (Robinson, 1995a, 1996a, 1996b, 1997a), and ideas about conceptually driven
processing versus data-driven processing (Robinson, 1995b).  However, other theoretical
positions, in particular Krashen's (1981, 1982, 1994), seem to ignore findings from
cognitive psychology and rely on the enigmatic workings of a LAD to explain how
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languages are acquired.  Unfortunately, such theoretical positions do nothing to
illuminate the cognitive processes involved in SLA.
1Although the researcher did not keep a record of his Japanese learning experience, it is his subjective
opinion that he had an experience similar to this hypothetical learner.  Japanese is a language which does
not require subjects to be stated.  In fact, not omitting subjects often results in unnatural-sounding language
production.  The researcher learned Japanese in a mixed instructional and naturalistic setting, but does not
remember ever being explicitly informed that he could omit subjects.  However, after being in Japan a few
months and attempting to interact in Japanese on an almost daily basis, the researcher noticed that, while he
always used watashi  or boku (both mean I) when stating what he wanted to do, what he liked, what he did,
etc. . . , Japanese speakers almost never used these words.  The researcher then began consciously to drop
watashi and boku in first person singular contexts.  Although the researcher had the concept of grammatical
subject, it was only much later that he realized that all subjects, not just the first person singular subject
pronoun, could usually be dropped in Japanese.  In other words, he initially noticed that watashi and boku
could be dropped without having to refer to the concept of grammatical subject.
2In ACT*, separate procedural rules, or productions, could be made more efficient through a process of
composition, the joining of separate productions into a single new production.  As explicitly pointed out in
Anderson (1993), the process of composition has been dropped from ACT-R.  Instead, multiple productions
can deposit a new example in declarative memory, which may then be used by analogy in the compilation
of a single new production.
3There is, I believe, an ethical problem with the Japanese study.  The participants in the study are learners
of Japanese who, presumably, desire to learn the language.  They are not participants in a study using an
artificial language for whom it is unimportant whether they actually learn to communicate in the language.
Even so, learners are taught a structure, the correct ordering of adjectives, which does not actually exist in
Japanese.  For example, in Japanese, both akaku e ookii hako (red large box) and ookikute akai hako (large
red box) are grammatically correct.  It seems to be a disservice to the learners to teach them something
which is not only useless but also untrue.
4All learners who participated in this study were students at an English language school at the time of their
participation.  It is the researcher's opinion that they form a single population.
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Appendix A—Place Names Used on Tests and in Instruction, Experiment One
Place Names Used in Instruction and on Both Tests
Schools:
Kaimuki Elementary School
George Washington High School
Countries:
Canada
France
Universities:
West Virginia University
Arizona University
Parks:
Kapiolani Park
Central Park
Single Mountains:
Mount Fuji
Mount Everest
Parts of Continents:
Central Africa
Western Australia
Hospitals:
General Hospital
Memorial Hospital
Single Lakes:
Lake Michigan
Lake Erie
Bays:
Hanauma Bay
Kaneohe Bay
Single Islands:
Easter Island
Saipan
Countries with e:
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the United Kingdom
the Republic of China
Universities with t e:
the University of Hawai‘i
the University of Florida
Tourist Attractions:
the Washington Monument
the Eiffel Tower
Regions:
the East Coast
the Middle East
Island Chains:
the Hawaiian Islands
the Falkland Islands
Hotels:
the Hilton Hotel
the Royal Hawaiian Hotel
Mountain Chains:
the Alps
the Himalayas
Rivers:
the Yellow River
the Nile River
Peninsulas:
the Iberian Peninsula
the Florida Peninsula
Associations:
the Young Women's Christian Association
the Hawaiian Association of Language Teachers
Place Names Used Only on Pretest
Schools:
Roosevelt Middle School
Oakwood Elementary School
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Countries:
Russia
Italy
Universities:
Hawai‘i Pacific University
Boston University
Parks:
Ala Wai Park
Ueno Park
Single Mountains:
Mount McKinley
Mount Kilimanjaro
Parts of Continents:
Southeast Asia
Central America
Hospitals:
Duke Hospital
Central Hospital
Single Lakes:
Lake Geneva
Lake Ontario
Bays:
San Francisco Bay
Tokyo Bay
Single Islands:
Tahiti
Molokai
Countries with e:
the Republic of Ireland
the United States
Universities with t e:
the University of Iowa
the University of South Carolina
Tourist Attractions:
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the Golden Gate Bridge
the Sphynx
Regions:
the Northwest
the Southeast
Island Chains:
the Marshall Islands
the Moldive Islands
Hotels:
the Outrigger Hotel
the Kahala Mandarin Hotel
Mountain Chains:
the Rocky Mountains
the Andes
Rivers:
the Mississippi River
the Jordan River
Peninsulas:
the Izu Peninsula
the Yucatan Peninsula
Associations:
the Young Buddhist Association
the American Association of Retired People
Place Names Used Only on Posttest
Schools:
John Adams Junior High School
McKinley High School
Countries:
Mexico
Egypt
Universities:
Oxford University
Harvard University
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Parks:
Maple Park
Old Stadium Park
Single Mountains:
Mount Etna
Mount Saint Helens
Parts of Continents:
South Asia
North Africa
Hospitals:
Shriner's Hospital
Presbyterian Hospital
Single Lakes:
Lake Norman
Lake Victoria
Bays:
Boston Bay
Charleston Bay
Single Islands:
Maui
Kauai
Countries with e:
the Republic of Korea
the United States of Mexico
Universities with t e:
the University of California
the University of Kentucky
Tourist Attractions:
the Brooklyn Bridge
the Pyramids
Regions:
the West Coast
the South
Island Chains:
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the Canary Islands
the Shetland Islands
Hotels:
the Ala Moana Hotel
the Sheraton Hotel
Mountain Chains:
the Ural Mountains
the Appalachian Mountains
Rivers:
the Thames River
the Amazon River
Peninsulas:
the Arabian Peninsula
the Korean Peninsula
Associations:
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
the National Basketball Association
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Appendix B—Rules of Thumb for Article Usage, Experiment One
Do not use "the" with the names of schools.
Do not use "the" with the names of most countries.
Do not use "the" with the names of universities that do not include the word "of."
Do not use "the" with the names of parks.
Do not use "the" with the names of single mountains.
Do not use "the" with the names of parts of continents.
Do not use "the" with the names of hospitals.
Do not use "the" with the names of single lakes.
Do not use "the" with the names of bays.
Do not use "the" with the names of single islands.
Use "the" with the names of tourist attractions.
Use "the" with the names of regions not including a continent or country name.
Use "the" with the names of island chains.
Use "the" with the names of hotels.
Use "the" with the names of mountain chains.
Use "the" with the names of countries that include words such as "republic," "united," or
"of."
Use "the" with the names of universities that include the word "of."
Use "the" with the names of rivers.
Use "the" with the names of peninsulas.
Use "the" with the names of associations.
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Appendix C--Questions Used on Delayed Posttest
1.  What is the highest mountain in the world?
2.  Where is Mount Everest?  Do you know the name of the mountain range?
3.  What is the highest mountain in Japan?
4.  What is the longest river in the world?
5.  Do you know the longest river in America?
6.  Can you name the countries in North America?
7.  What is the name of this island?
8.  What are some of the other islands around here?
9.  These islands together make a group of islands.  What's the group of islands' name?
10.  Do you know the names of any universities in Hawai‘i?
11.  Can you name any hotels in Waikiki?
12.  Can you name any good places to go snorkeling on Oahu?
13.  What part of the United States in California in?
14.  What part of the United States in New York in?
15.  Can you name any lakes in the world?
16.  Can you name any peninsulas in the world?
17.  Do you know the names of any schools in Honolulu, like elementary schools, or
junior high schools, or high schools?
18.  Where is Thailand?
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Appendix D--Sample Transcript of Delayed Posttest
R=Researcher
L=Learner
Note:  Tokens where L just repeats after R are not counted.  Self repetitions of a token by
L are not counted either.
R:  If you don't know the answer to a question, just say I don't know.
L:  Okay
R:  What is the highest mountain in the world?
L:  . . . Mount Everest.
R:  Where is Mount Everest?
L:  Tibet.
R:  Okay.  Well, Nepal.  Do you know the name of the, uh, mountain range, that it's part
of?
L:  No.
R:  Oh, the Himalayas.
L:  Mm.
R:  What's the highest mountain in Japan?
L:  Mount Fuji.
R:  Yeah.  What's the longest river in the world?
L:  . . . I don't know.
R:  Oh, probably the Nile.  Well, the Nile or the Amazon.  Do you know the longest river
in America?
L:  I don't know.
R:  Oh, the Mississippi.
L:  Mm.
R:  Uh, do you, can you name the countries in North America?
L:  . . . North America?  Countries?  (yeah)  uh, like New Jersey?
R:  Those, those are states.  (oh)  The whole country.
L:  The United States.
R:  Okay.  Any others?
L:  Alaska.
R:  Well, that's part of the United States.  Canada (Canada) or Mexico.  Uh . . .
L:  Mexico is North America?
R:  Yeah.  We consider that in North America.
L:  Oh, really?
R:  Yeah.  Uh, what is the name of this island?
L:  Hawai'i Island.
R:  This island?
L:  Oh!  Oahu Island.
R:  Okay.  (ha-ha)  What are some other islands around here?
L:  . . . Lanai Island, Big Island, Maui Island . . .
R:  Okay.  These islands together make a group of islands.  What's the group of islands'
name?
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L:  Hawai'i.
R:  Okay.  Also the Hawaiian Islands
L:  The Hawaiian . . .
R:  Uh, do you know the names of any universities in Hawai'i?
L:  UH.
R:  What's the full name?
L:  University of Hawai'i.
R:  Okay, do you know any others?
L:  KCC . . . uh, Kapiolani Communications College.
R:  Community College.
L:  Community College.
R:  ICC is Intercultural Communications College.  Those are community colleges.  Okay,
uh, can you name any hotels in Waikiki?
L:  The Hilton Hawaiian Village, the Hyatt Regency, . . . the Hyatt Regency . . . many
many.
R:  Okay.  A very different question, the next question, uh, can you name any good
places to go snorkeling in, on Oahu?
L:  Mm, Hanauma Bay.
R:  Okay.  And a very different question.  What part of the United States is California in?
L:  . . . West.
R:  Yeah, the West Coast.
L:  The West Coast.
R:  What part of the United States is New York in?
L:  The East Coast.
R:  Okay.  Can you name any lakes in the world?
L:  Lakes? . . . Victoria Lake?
R:  Okay.  (I don't know.)  Can you name any peninsulas in the world?
L:  . . . Korean Peninsula.
R:  Okay.  And, do you know the names of any schools in Honolulu, like elementary
schools, or junior high schools, or high schools?
L:  Kaimuki High School.
R:  Okay.  And one more question.  Where is Thailand?
L:  I know, in Asia.
R:  What part of Asia?
L:  I don't know.
R:  Okay, Southeast Asia.
L:  Southeast.
R:  Very good.
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Appendix E--Replacement Items Used in Experiment Two
Pretest, Instruction, and Posttest Items:
Libraries:
McCully Library
Hamilton Library
Deserts:
the Sahara Desert
the Painted Desert
Pretest:
Libraries:
Sinclair Library
Kaneohe Library
Deserts:
the Mojave Desert
the Gobi Desert
Posttest:
Libraries:
Metropolitan Library
Manoa Library
Deserts:
the Arabian Desert
the Atacama Desert
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ABSTRACT
Explicit instruction can facilitate learner awareness of the surface features of a
language, but does not guarantee it.  Similarly, learners in an incidental learning
condition are not necessarily unaware.  This study investigated the development of
awareness, among Japanese ESL learners, of rules of thumb for the use of zero and
definite articles with place names under an explicit instruction condition, in which
learners were given the rules plus examples, and an incidental instruction condition, in
which learners responded to sentences containing examples.  All instruction was
computerized.  Instruction was given in English and was followed by a twenty-question
debriefing interview conducted in the learners' L1 in order to assess their awareness.  The
findings show that awareness could develop under either condition, but that the explicit
condition was much more facilitative.  The study also found a very strong relationship
between awareness and improved learner performance.
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1Chapter One
The Role of Awareness in Learning and Acquisition
Introduction
The role of consciousness in second language acquisition (SLA) continues to
divide researchers, with some claiming that it plays no role in the acquisition of linguistic
competence and others claiming that there can be no acquisition without it.  Arguments
about consciousness are complicated by the imprecision of the terms consciousand
unconscious , limiting the usefulness of these terms.  In addition, while researchers who
see no role for consciousness in language acquisition generally argue that the acquisition
of language is qualitatively different from other kinds of learning, researchers in the field
of cognitive psychology, who have also been debating the role of consciousness in
learning, generally do not give language acquisition such unique status.
This chapter discusses the different theoretical positions on one aspect of
consciousness, awareness, during SLA, examines theories of learning in cognitive
psychology, and looks at the relationship between cognitive psychology and SLA.
Chapter Two discusses how effects of instruction studies have and have not examined the
role of awareness.  Chapters Three and Four describe two empirical experiments
investigating the role of awareness.  Finally, Chapter Five discusses the results and
implications of the experiments.
2Definitions
Both McLaughlin (1990) and Schmidt (1994a) have described the imprecision of
the terms conscious and unconscious and have proposed more precise terminology to
describe the different meanings that these terms can refer to.  There can, though, also be
confusion over ostensibly more precise terms, such as explicit and implicit.  In an effort
to avoid confusion, the terms conscious and unconscious will mostly be avoided in this
paper and the following definitions will be used for other terminology.
First, based on the recommendations of Schmidt (1994a), the term incidental is
used to refer to the learning of features which learners do not intend to learn (Schmidt’s
recommendation 1).  In the third chapter, the term incidental instruction, rather than
incidental learning, will be used since it is believed that some learners receiving
incidental instruction may actually be learning intentionally.  Explicit is used to refer to
learning and instruction which involve the provision of rules (Schmidt’s recommendation
6).  Again, in the third chapter, it is possible that learners will not learn anything from the
rules and examples provided to learners, so the term explici  instruction is used rather
than explicit learning.
Next, awareness i  defined, or rather operationalized, as the ability of learners to
verbalize, in their first language (L1), knowledge of instructional targets soon after the
instruction has been completed.  This knowledge may be expressed as either rules or
examples.  It is quite possible that there are aware learners who are unable to verbalize
this awareness (Schmidt, 1994a), and McLaughlin (1990) has described "learning with
awareness" (p.628) and "ability to report what is known" (p. 628) as separate aspects of
the term conscious.  However, for the purposes of this paper, learners who are unable to
3verbalize are described as less- aware while learners who are able to verbalize are
described as more-aware.  It does not seem possible, at the present time, to assess
awareness directly and, therefore, the researcher will rely on the indirect measure of
ability to verbalize.  The instrument used to assess awareness in this study is described in
the third chapter.
Implicit learning (Reber, 1989; Winter & Reber, 1994) is defined as the ability to
induce knowledge of rules underlying a complex stimulus domain by focussing attention
on the surface features of that domain.  Tacit knowledge refers to the knowledge base
resulting from such learning.  Neither implicit learning nor tacit knowledge necessarily
entail a lack of awareness of surface features during learning.  What learners are unaware
of is the rule system that they are believed to have induced from regularities in the
surface features as well as the process of inducing this system.
Finally, subliminal learning is used to describe learning which is supposed to
occur in the complete absence of any awareness of what is being learned.  It should be
noted here that, along with Schmidt (1990, 1993, 1994b, 1995), the author is skeptical of
any role for subliminal learning in language acquisition.
Language Acquisition and Awareness
Acquisition without awareness.   Arguments that SLA occurs without awareness
generally draw a distinction between learning and acquisition.  For example, according to
Krashen (1981, 1982, 1994), language learning is a conscious process in which learners
learn and are aware of facts about the language, while acquisition is incidental and
implicit in that learners acquire language while they are focused on communication and
4they do not become aware of facts about the language.  Krashen, and often others who
draw this distinction between learning and acquisition, also takes a strong noninterface
position—he claims that learning can never be transformed into acquisition.  Therefore, if
Krashen is correct, explicit instruction should be of almost no benefit to people
attempting to acquire a second language.  Also, taking an explicit approach to learning a
language, that is, trying to figure out rules, trying to apply conscious knowledge, focusing
attention on form, should be of almost no benefit as well.  The only benefits explicit
instruction or explicit learning strategies can provide are 1) giving learners a rather
clumsy set of tools for monitoring their output when conditions allow and 2) providing
learners with samples of the language which may possibly contain elements which can be
acquired.
Paradis (1994) also argues in support of learning without awareness.  Paradis,
echoing Krashen, claims that only “implicit linguistic competence” can be used
automatically, that grammatical knowledge can be used to check correctness but not as
“part of the automatic production process,” and that this “metalinguistic knowledge”
cannot be proceduralized, or converted into linguistic competence.  For Paradis,
developing linguistic competence means developing automaticity in the use of the
language, and “what becomes automatic is not what the learners focus their attention on,
or are even aware of” (p. 402).  Paradis supports his claims with evidence from
neurolinguistics, which supposedly shows that different parts of the brain are responsible
for the use of implicit linguistic competence and conscious grammatical knowledge of
which learners are aware.
5Some researchers who study SLA within a Universal Grammar (UG) framework
also support the distinction between learning and acquisition and the claim that the
acquisition of linguistic competence occurs in the absence of awareness.  Zobl (1995)
argues that UG provides theoretical support for the learning/acquisition distinction and
claims that empirical evidence shows that acquisition but not learning is uniform across
learners, that acquisition is resistant to forgetting, that explicit metalinguistic knowledge
is dissociated from learner performance, and that natural languages are too complex to be
acquired by general, non-linguistic learning mechanisms.  Schwartz (1986, 1993) draws a
distinction, similar to Krashen's, between linguistic competence, which is based on UG
and acquired through a language specific language acquisition device (LAD), and learned
linguistic knowledge (LLK), which is learned explicitly using general learning
mechanisms.  Linguistic competence can only be developed on the basis of positive
evidence in the input.  Negative evidence about what is not possible, explicit instruction,
and error correction can result in LLK, but have no impact on linguistic competence.  The
acquisition of LLK may require awareness but the acquisition of linguistic competence
does not.  However, her position is somewhat different from the positions of Krashen and
Paradis in that LLK may play an important role in helping second language speakers, if
they have a highly developed, but ultimately unnative-like, linguistic competence and
plenty of practice, display native-like behavior.  The use of LLK does not have to be slow
and clumsy.
Finally, Bialystok (1994; Bialystok & Sharwood Smith, 1985) draws a completely
different distinction between two orthogonal dimensions of language acquisition, one of
analysis of knowledge and one of control of processing.  Unlike the learning/acquisition
6distinction, development along both these dimensions is necessary for the acquisition of
linguistic competence.  Awareness is not seen as necessary for development along either
dimension.
It is not completely clear in Krashen's writings whether what he calls the
subconscious process of language acquisition should be called implicit or subliminal.
Krashen (1994) calls the process “implicit” and “incidental,” but implicit, as defined
above, means the unconscious induction of rules based on what is attended to, and
incidental means language learning without the intention to learn while focusing on
meaning.  Neither implicit nor incidental language learning necessarily take place in the
absence of awareness of surface features, and for language learning to be implicit, it need
only occur in the absence of awareness of the rules underlying noticed surface features
and the induction of such rules.  However, with his input hypothesis, affective filter
hypothesis, and acquisition-learning hypothesis, Krashen strongly implies that acquisition
is unconscious in the sense of occurring in the total absence of awareness.  According to
the input hypothesis (Krashen, 1994), input becomes available to the LAD, that is,
becomes intake, by being comprehensible and by being at the i+1 level, t at is, by being
just above the learner’s current level.  Assuming that the learner’s affective filter is low,
i+1 input will then be used for acquisition.  In this scheme, awareness, attention, etc.,
play absolutely no role.  According to the acquisition-learning hypothesis, learned
knowledge, which seems to mean both that the knowledge was explicitly learned and is
held in explicit memory, can never become acquisition, so in fact it is impossible for
awareness to play any role.  It seems that what Krashen, as well as Paradis and other
supporters of acquisition without awareness, is arguing for is not implicit language
7acquisition so much as subliminal language acquisition, that is, acquisition without any
attention to or awareness of any aspect of what is acquired.
No acquisition without awareness.  On the other hand, according to Schmidt’s
noticing hypothesis (1990, 1993, 1994b, 1995; called the noticing the gap principle in
Schmidt & Frota, 1986), awareness at the level of noticing is necessary to convert input
into intake which can be used for SLA.  Robinson (1995b) also supports a role for
noticing in SLA and precisely defines "noticing as detection with awareness and
rehearsal in short-term memory" (p. 318).  The noticing hypothesis does not imply that
learners call on explicitly held rules during fluent second language use or that learners
necessarily have episodic or recognition memory of what they have learned.  Rather, it
means that a certain level of awareness of language features exists at the time that those
features are acquired.  Also, while the noticing hypothesis states that awareness is
necessary and sufficient for converting input to intake, it does not imply that awareness is
sufficient for SLA.  As is obvious from the number of people who have learned and are
aware of facts about a language yet cannot communicate in it, input and interaction are
necessary for the development of fluency in a second language (Schmidt, 1995).
According to the noticing hypothesis, unconscious language learning, that is, SLA
without awareness, or subliminal SLA, is not possible.
Schmidt (1995) also points out a basic flaw in the argument that the complexity of
languages requires that they be learned unconsciously (e.g., Krashen, 1994; Paradis,
1994), since conscious acquisition of something as complex as a natural language would
be impossible.  While, for example, the general failure of instructed ESL learners to
master the English article system indicates the insufficiency of instruction, “the typical
8failure of both instructed and uninstructed learners in these areas of grammar counts even
more heavily against arguments for the success of implicit learning” (p. 40).  The general
lack of people who have successfully and completely acquired a second language as
adults may be the result of the complexity of natural languages, but this does not mean
that unconscious learning provides a way around this complexity.  As DeKeyser (1994)
points out, it is very difficult, maybe even impossible, to find people with a high level of
second language proficiency who have acquired this second language as adults and who
have never received any explicit instruction nor ever adopted any explicit learning
strategies.
Unfortunately, the noticing hypothesis can  probably be neither proven nor
falsified (Schmidt, 1995).  As Schmidt states, awareness at the time of learning “is
fleeting and cannot be completely recorded” (p. 28).  Therefore, it cannot be shown that
learning always occurs with awareness or that learning can occur in the complete absence
of awareness.  However, it should be possible, by gathering in-depth evidence of learner
awareness shortly after learning, to compare the learning of more-aware and less-aware
learners.  If the learning of more-aware learners is superior to that of less-aware learners,
this would support, though of course not prove, the noticing hypothesis.  If the learning of
more-aware learners is not superior, or even inferior, this would provide counter-
evidence to the noticing hypothesis, even though it would not disprove it.  (Of course, in
either scenario, the measure of awareness would have to meet certain criteria.  See
below.)
Robinson (1995a, 1996a, 1996b, 1997a) has proposed the fundamental similarity
hypothesis, which claims that all adult second language learning is based on the same
9conscious mechanisms.  What may appear to be unconscious implicit or incidental
learning still involves attention to, noticing of, and rehearsal in memory of the linguistic
features which are learned.  In other words, implicit and incidental learning rely on
conscious processes.  While the conscious mechanisms underlying SLA are
fundamentally similar, different types of instruction and task demands can encourage
different varieties of conscious processing.  As Robinson (1996b) states:
. . . all L2 learning is the result of conscious awareness of form at the point of
input, which is explicitly attended . . . (and) the effects of learning under implicit
and explicit conditions are artifacts of the variety of conscious processing
encouraged by different task demands. (p. 180)
Obviously, the claim that L2 learning results from “awareness of form at the point of
input” is identical to the noticing hypothesis of Schmidt discussed above.  As will be
discussed in chapter two, Robinson has found empirical support for the fundamental
similarity hypothesis in general and for the causal role of awareness in SLA in particular.
Finally, DeKeyser (1994) argues that there is a tendency in SLA research “to
equate implicit vs. explicit knowledge with knowledge acquired implicitly vs. explicitly”
(p. 85).  This is similar to Schmidt (1995), who points out that the existence of implicit
knowledge is irrelevant to the question of awareness at the point of learning.  DeKeyser
(1994) argues as well that studies investigating the knowledge used by advanced L2
speakers “do not shed any direct light . . . on the relationship between the two types of
knowledge at the time a specific rule is learned” (p. 85).  In other words, lack of
conscious awareness of L2 rules on the part of fluent and accurate speakers does not
entail that the learners were not consciously aware of rules or of formal features of the L2
when they first learned them.
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Tomlin and Villa (1994) argue that it is detection, a component of attention, and
not awareness which is necessary for acquisition.  In their view, detection can be
facilitated by the other two components of attention—alertness and orientation—and
these other components can be facilitated by awareness.  Awareness, therefore, can
indirectly facilitate detection and acquisition, but detection is possible without awareness,
so awareness is not necessary to convert input into intake.  Unlike Krashen (1981, 1982,
1994), Paradis (1994), and others who argue for two learning systems, though, Tomlin
and Villa do not argue for two learning systems, one requiring awareness and the other
not.  Instead, they argue that detection and awareness can be dissociated and that it is
detection, not awareness, which is necessary for learning to take place.  However, Tomlin
and Villa admit, in an endnote, that there are problems in separating detection and
awareness empirically:
Cognitive registration of information has been dissociated from awareness, but
detection of targets has most often been assessed via a response that implicates
awareness. (p. 199)
Schmidt (1995) points out that the studies cited by Tomlin and Villa as evidence
for a dissociation between detection and awareness actually show “a very strong
relationship between awareness and learning” (p. 21) and “more learning with more
noticing and less learning with less noticing” (p. 22).  While Schmidt admits that
detection and awareness can be dissociated, and that there is evidence that certain kinds
of perception, that is, subliminal perception and blindsight perception, are possible
without awareness, he argues that learning without awareness has not been demonstrated,
that awareness is good for learning, and “that focal attention and awareness are
essentially isomorphic” (p. 20).
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Truscott (1998a) criticizes the noticing hypothesis.  First, he claims, correctly,
that a weak version of the noticing hypothesis, that simple awareness of the existence of
input is necessary for SLA, is uninteresting.  He then claims that the strong version, that
awareness of grammatical details is necessary for SLA, is not supported by empirical
evidence from cognitive psychology and is not clear about what exactly needs to be
noticed.  Truscott claims that implicit learning studies in the field of cognitive
psychology allow one "safely (to) conclude that the evidence does not show that
awareness of the information to be acquired is necessary for learning" (p. 109).  Given
that Truscott admits that "no firm conclusions can be drawn about implicit learning"
(p.109), it is somewhat surprising that he is able safely to reach this conclusion.
Specifically, it is not clear whether sequence learning demonstrated under implicit
conditions results from a tacit knowledge of rules gained in the absence of awareness or
from memory of allowable sequences (Shanks & St. John, 1994).  Also, since implicit
learning as operationalized in cognitive psychology does involve attention to and
awareness of surface features, it is not incompatible with the noticing hypothesis.
Truscott's other criticism, that it is not clear exactly what details need to be
noticed, is valid—empirical investigations of the noticing hypothesis need to specify
what learners are becoming aware of.  However, Truscott's argument that, for example,
noticing the absence of subject pronouns in Spanish requires the concept of grammatical
subject is incorrect.  Conceivably, a native speaker of English, with no explicit concept of
subject, learning Spanish naturalistically in a Spanish-speaking country, could notice that
Spanish-speakers often seem to drop y  when talking about things they do themselves.
This hypothetical learner would not need the concept of grammatical subject in order to
12
notice this and would not need to be aware of a rule such as, You can drop subject
pronouns.1
Truscott argues for a reformulation of the noticing hypothesis, claiming that
noticing is necessary for the acquisition of metalinguistic knowledge but not for SLA.
Such a reformulation would make the noticing hypothesis compatible with Krashen's
learning/acquisition distinction in that noticing would be necessary for learning but not
for acquisition.  In making this reformulation, Truscott points out that empirical studies
of the noticing hypothesis have generally assessed learning through tests which may tap
metalinguistic knowledge rather that linguistic competence.  This is also a valid
criticism—investigations of the role of awareness in SLA need to use assessment
measures that are less likely to rely solely on metalinguistic knowledge.  However, if
such measures are developed, then the noticing hypothesis can be investigated without
such a reformulation.
Learning and Awareness in Cognitive Psychology
In general, researchers in SLA, particularly those who support language
acquisition without awareness, believe that language acquisition is fundamentally
different from other kinds of learning.  For example, Schwartz (1986) argues that there is
overwhelming evidence that first language acquisition is different from other kinds of
learning and that the null hypothesis in SLA research should be that first and second
language acquisition rely on the same mechanisms.  This null hypothesis thus entails that
second language acquisition is also qualitatively different from other kinds of learning.
In the field of cognitive psychology, however, common mechanisms are generally
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assumed to underlie all higher cognitive functions, including language acquisition (e.g.,
Anderson, 1983, 1993; Reber, 1989).  Rather than looking at possible differences in the
learning of knowledge from different domains, research and debates in the field of
cognitive psychology tend to concern distinctions between explicit and implicit learning,
between attentional and non-attentional learning, and between instance-based and rule-
based learning.  This section discusses some evidence for and against these distinctions
and of how they relate to SLA.  This section does not, though, provide a comprehensive
review of the field of cognitive psychology, as this would be beyond the scope of this
paper.
Explicit and implicit learning.  Reber is one of the most prolific researchers in
cognitive psychology claiming a dissociation between learning and awareness.  In a
review of his own and other’s work on implicit learning and the resulting tacit knowledge
base (Reber, 1989), Reber claims that learning the underlying rules of a complex stimulus
domain occurs implicitly, in the absence of awareness of the rules, and results in abstract,
structured knowledge, a tacitly held system of rules, which also exists in the absence of
awareness.  However, this does not mean that implicit learning takes place without
attention being directed to the stimulus domain—implicit learning is “a by-product of the
application of attention to relevant rule-governed structures in the environment” (Winter
& Reber, 1994, p. 117).  In other words, attention is given to surface features, implicating
awareness of those features at the point of learning.
Reber’s research paradigm is not directly related to SLA, but superficially his
position would seem to support the positions of Krashen and Paradis, especially since
Reber (1989; Winter & Reber, 1994) claims that implicit learning has a distinct
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advantage over explicit learning—implicit learning can, and will, take place when the
rules underlying a complex stimulus domain cannot be found, while explicit learning can
only happen when such rules can be found.  This is similar to Krashen’s assertion (1981,
1982, 1994; also Zobl, 1995) that only simple second language rules can be consciously
learned while more complex rules can only be acquired.  However, while both Krashen
and Paradis take a strong non-interface position, arguing that learning can never be
converted into acquisition, in Reber’s view, it is the attending to and memorization of
surface features of a complex domain (that is, the memorization of sequences) that leads
to unconscious induction of the rules underlying the domain.  In fact, implicit learning in
the experimental work of Reber is operationalized by instructing learners to memorize
sequences generated by a complex underlying set of rules.  Thus learners are aware of
surface features but are unaware of rules either at the time of learning or when they are
used.  According to Reber (1989), for the “sophisticated processes (which) are more
uniquely the stuff of humanity” (p. 232), some tacit knowledge can be “derived from
explicit processes that (become) automatic only after pained, conscious action” (p. 232).
Another difference with Krashen is that Krashen (1981, 1982, 1994), by giving a major
role in SLA to a LAD, takes a nativist position in which there exists a mental organ
specifically for acquiring language, a position also taken by Schwartz (1986, 1993) and
Zobl (1995).  Reber (1989; Winter & Reber, 1994), on the other hand, argues that the
process of implicit learning is a generalized cognitive process of interacting with the
environment and is not unique to any one domain.
Not everyone accepts that Reber's work provides supporting evidence of the
existence of implicit learning.  In a review of the evidence for and against the existence
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of unconscious learning, Shanks and St. John (1994) conclude that the existence of
learning without awareness has not been adequately demonstrated.  One of their main
criticisms of empirical studies which are claimed as evidence for learning without
awareness is the instruments used to measure participants’ awareness.  They give two
criteria, the information criterion and the sensitivity criterion, for deciding whether a
particular measure of awareness is adequate:
Information Criterion:  Before concluding that subjects are unaware of the
information that they have learned and that is influencing their behavior, it must
be possible to establish that the information the experimenter is looking for in the
awareness test is indeed the information responsible for performance changes. (p.
373)
Sensitivity Criterion:  To show that two dependent variables (in this case, tests of
conscious knowledge and task performance) relate to dissociable underlying
systems, we must be able to show that our test of awareness is sensitive to all of
the relevant conscious knowledge. (p. 373)
Shanks and St. John argue that the measures of awareness used in studies in which it is
claimed that learning took place without awareness all fail to meet one or both of these
criteria.  For example, in studies of sequence learning, the measure of awareness may be
designed to assess whether participants are aware of rules underlying the sequences,
while what participants are actually aware of are permissible sequence fragments, and it
is these fragments, not rules, which are responsible for participants' improved
performance.  In this situation, the information criterion would be unmet.  On the other
hand, participants may actually be aware of some kind of rule, but be unable to put it into
words.  In this situation, a measure which asked participants to state the rules they are
aware of would fail the sensitivity criterion.
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Whittlesea and Wright (1997) argue and provide evidence against separate
mechanisms for implicit and explicit learning.  They argue that in all learning, both
implicit and explicit processes play a role.  Learners are aware of the stimuli that they are
processing and are aware of how they are processing them.  They are, however, unaware
of how their processing will influence what they learn.  For example, in levels of
processing experiments in which learners process stimuli either graphemically,
phonemically, or semantically, learners are aware of the actual stimuli and the level at
which they are processing the stimuli.  They are, though, unaware that there is a higher
probability that they will be able later to recognize a processed stimulus if they process it
semantically rather than graphemically or phonemically.  The arguments of Whittlesea
and Wright are similar to arguments made by Robinson (1995b), discussed below, for
different kinds of processing, not learning, in SLA
Finally, Curran and Keele (1993) reformulate the distinction between implicit and
explicit learning, claiming a distinction between attentional and non-attentional learning.
They compared sequential learning taking place under single-task and dual-task
conditions by learners who had been informed of the sequence, by learners who had not
been informed but had developed some awareness of the sequence, and by learners who
had not been informed and had seemed not to have developed much awareness.  It was
found that while under single-task conditions more awareness coincided with more
learning, under dual-task conditions differences between groups disappeared, with all
groups learning very little.  The researchers claim that the small amount of learning that
occurred under dual-task conditions was non-attentional learning.  However, as pointed
out by Schmidt (1995), under the single-task condition, this study found more learning
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with more awareness, and under the dual-task condition the small amount of learning
which took place cannot be shown to have occurred in the complete absence of
awareness.
The evidence for the existence of separate mechanisms for implicit and explicit
learning is not overwhelming.  In addition, the distinction between implicit and explicit
learning is not comparable to the distinction in SLA between acquisition and learning, at
least not as the distinction is drawn by Krashen.  Implicit learning is claimed to be the
abstraction of structured tacit knowledge as a result attention to the surface features of a
complex stimulus domain.  Acquisition is claimed to take place without attention to the
surface features of the second language.  Also, implicit learning is seen as a general
learning mechanism applicable across domains, while acquisition is seen as language
specific.
Rule-based and instance-based learning.  While Shanks and St. John (1994) do
not find evidence of a dissociation between explicit and implicit learning, they do find
evidence of a dissociation between instance-based learning and rule-based learning.  For
example, they argue that instance-based learning, or the memorization of strings and
substrings, can explain the results of sequence learning experiments in which participants
display learning but are unable to verbalize the rules underlying the sequences.  In such
experiments, rather than implicitly learning abstract rules, participants are able to apply
their knowledge of instances.  They point out, though, that there is ample evidence that
rule learning is also possible, such as when participants are told something about the rules
underlying the sequences.
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In instance theory, Logan (1988, 1990, 1992; Logan & Etherton, 1994) explains
automaticity in terms of instance-based learning.  In performing non-automatic tasks, a
general algorithm is used, while in automatic tasks, instances are retrieved directly from
memory and applied to the task.  Instances do not replace the algorithm in memory.
Instead, when a task is performed, there is a race between the algorithm and the retrieval
of specific instances.  As the number of instances increases, so does the likelihood that
one of them will win the race and the algorithm will not be applied.  Logan thus views
the development of automaticity as a move from rule-based to instance-based processing.
In most theories that deal with automaticity, the phenomenon will only develop
after extensive practice.  Logan (1990), though, argues that the same mechanism,
retrieval of instances, underlies both automaticity and repetition priming.  In this view,
automaticity exists along a continuum.  When defined as the direct retrieval and
application of instances, automaticity can exist after even just a few encounters with a
stimulus.  The small amount of speed-up observed in studies of repetition priming is
quantitatively different from the greater decrease in latency observed in studies of
automaticity involving many more trials, but it is not qualitatively different in that the
same process of instance retrieval underlies both phenomena.
The most recent version of adaptive control of thought theory, ACT-Rational
(ACT-R) (Anderson, 1993; Anderson & Fincham, 1994; Anderson, et. al, 1997;
Anderson & Labiere, 1998), gives a much stronger role to examples than had existed in
ACT* (Anderson, 1983).  In both ACT-R and ACT*, new knowledge always begins in a
declarative form of which learners are at least potentially aware.  Through the process of
applying this knowledge, it can be proceduralized to produce productions which are used
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in skilled application of knowledge and of which learners cannot be aware.  However, in
ACT* declarative knowledge of instructions or rules could be used to produce
productions, while in ACT-R knowledge can only be proceduralized by drawing an
analogy to a declarative example.  Declarative instructions and rules can only be used
indirectly to access or create an example.  This is one of the major changes that prompted
Anderson to change the name of the theory.
A further change to the theory, although one which does not prompt a name
change, appears in Anderson, et. al (1997), in which there is now a role for the direct
retrieval and application of instances during performance of a cognitive skill, thus
allowing for instance-based learning in ACT theory.  This is a noticeable change from
both ACT* and earlier versions of ACT-R, in which examples were only used for
analogy before proceduralization.  Skilled behavior, such as fluent use of a second
language, was viewed as based completely on productions, or rules held in procedural
memory.  In the latest versions of ACT-R, though, skilled behavior can be either rule-
based or instance-based.  Proceduralized rules are extremely fast, and can become even
faster as a result of strengthening through practice2, but in situations where an exact
match for a stimuli is held as an instance in declarative memory, and the instance is
readily accessible, then that instance can also be applied.  As in Logan, there is a race
between applying rules and applying instances, and instances will be applied whenever
they can win this race.  It must be remembered, though, that Anderson's productions have
a much better chance than Logan's algorithms of winning the race against instances and
that ACT-R is still very much a rule-based system.
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Complicating the distinction between rule-based learning and instance-based
learning is the likelihood that the degree of similarity between novel items and previously
encountered examples will affect how well learners can use examples, rather than rules,
to make generalizations (e.g., Ross, 1987; Ross & Kennedy, 1990).  Palmeri (1997) has
tried to account for similarity by developing a model integrating Logan's instance theory
of automatization and a theory of instance-based categorization (Nosofsky, 1986), called
the exemplar-based random walk (EBRW) model.  In this model, the degree of similarity
between an instance accessed from memory and a novel item will determine the degree to
which the instance helps learners categorize the novel item.  The paradigm used by
Palmeri (numerosity judgements) and his operationalization of similarity (distorting to a
specific percent a pattern of dots used in training with a randomly generated pattern
containing the same number of dots) are, of course, not applicable to studies of SLA.
However, it must be recognized that similarity between novel items and previous
instances may influence learners' ability to make use of instance-based rather than rule-
based learning.
Neither instance-based nor rule-based learning is subliminal.  Awareness is
implicated in some way in both types of learning.  In ACT theory (Anderson, 1983,
1993), the rules in procedural memory are not accessible to awareness, but new
knowledge always begins in declarative form, which is.  In instance theory (Logan, 1988;
Logan & Etherton, 1994), an instance is encoded in memory if it is attended to.  The
amount of attention paid to an instance will determine how well it is encoded.  Implicit
learning (e.g., Reber, 1989; Winter & Reber, 1994) is claimed to result in tacit rule-based
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knowledge, but it also involves attention to the surface features of a stimulus domain.
Cognitive psychology does not provide evidence for any kind of subliminal learning.
Cognitive Psychology and SLA
Researchers in SLA (e.g., Schwartz, 1986, 1993; Zobl, 1995) have tended to draw
more heavily on linguistic theory, particularly UG, than on theories from cognitive
psychology .  This bias probably results from as well as supports the belief that language
acquisition is qualitatively different from other kinds of learning.  However, there also
seems to be a trend in more recent research and theory toward making greater use of
cognitive psychology.  In the final section of this chapter, some possible connections
between cognitive psychology and SLA theory are described.
As discussed above, Robinson, Schmidt, and Tomlin and Villa have all drawn on
cognitive psychology in discussing the role of attention in SLA.  According to Tomlin
and Villa (1994), evidence from cognitive psychology indicates that detection is
necessary for learning, while Schmidt (1995) expresses surprise that Tomlin and Villa
were able to draw the conclusion that awareness is not necessary based on the studies that
they reviewed.  Schmidt (1990, 1993, 1994b, 1995) draws on cognitive psychology to
argue that noticing at the level of awareness is necessary for the conversion of input to
intake.  Robinson (1995b) also draws on cognitive psychology to define noticing more
precisely as detection with awareness as well as rehearsal in short-term memory.  A few
recent empirical studies, which will be discussed in the next chapter, have found
empirical support for the role of noticing in SLA.
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Schmidt (1992) also discusses how learning mechanisms proposed in cognitive
psychology may help explain spoken second language fluency.  Of the seven mechanisms
reviewed by Schmidt, three, automatic and controlled processing, executive control, and
restructuring, are unable to explain the power law of practice in skill development, "the
most important test of any theory of cognitive learning" (p. 375).  The other four are
Anderson's ACT*, instance theory, strength theories, and chunking.  The first of these
may be used to explain how fluent L2 speakers may be able to apply proceduralized rules
even though they cannot remember the declarative origins of the rules.  However,
Schmidt argues that there is:
little theoretical support from psychology . . . that the development of fluency in
a second language is almost exclusively a matter of the increasingly skillful
application of rules. (p. 377)
The other three learning mechanisms may explain how formulas may be used in fluent
speaking and how these formulas may interact with creative language production.
Schmidt points out that if memory for formulas is important for fluent speech, then this
would go against conventional wisdom of the peripheral role of formulaic speech.
Schmidt (1992) also points out a shortcoming of applying theories from cognitive
psychology to L2 fluency:
. . . the mechanisms made available by psychological theorizing for
understanding L2 fluency derive primarily from . . . tasks that cannot be assumed
to rely necessarily on the same learning mechanisms as speaking a second
language. (p. 379)
However, if learning mechanisms from cognitive psychology could be used to explain
SLA and second language use, then there would be no reason to claim that SLA is
different from other kinds of learning.
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Robinson (1995b) draws on cognitive psychology to propose two different modes
of processing, both of which involve awareness, which may be used in SLA.  Data-driven
processing is the same as instance-based learning.  It:
. . . requires accumulation and rehearsal of instances encountered in the input in
memory, and may lead to the development of simple patterns of association
between co-occurring items.  (pp. 301-302)
Robinson (1997b; Robinson & Ha, 1993) has also conducted studies of the role of
instance-based learning in SLA.  Conceptually-driven processing is a type of rule-based
learning.  It:
. . . requires the elaboration of input following activation of schemata . . . and the
attendant rehearsal of more abstract patterns of hierarchical organization.  (p. 302)
It should be noted that this distinction is between two different kinds of processing, not
between different kinds of learning.  Awareness is involved in both kinds of processing.
The type of processing, though, will influence what gets noticed.  This is similar to the
arguments of Whittlesea and Wright (1997) against separate implicit and explicit learning
mechanisms.
Truscott (1998b) is somewhat unusual in that he proposes a model of SLA which
draws on both Logan's instance theory, from cognitive psychology, and UG, a theory
which views language acquisition as qualitatively different from other kinds of learning.
In this model, UG provides the innate and invariant aspects of language while leaving
"open the language-specific details, which are supplied through instance-based learning"
(p. 265).  Truscott then goes on to argue that Krashen's learning/acquisition distinction
can be recast with learning being the development of algorithms and acquisition the
accumulation of instances.  Unlike Robinson (1995b), who states that instance
24
accumulation, or data-driven processing, involves awareness, Truscott is not clear
whether this accumulation of instances would involve awareness.  However, since, as
Robinson argues, the encoding of instances requires that they first be attended to,
instance accumulation implicates awareness.  In addition, since in Logan's instance
theory (1988; Logan & Etherton, 1994) the application of an algorithm creates an
instance which is then encoded in memory, if learning is the development of algorithms
and acquisition is the accumulation of instances, there would, in Truscott's model, be an
interface between learning and acquisition.  Thus, Truscott's recasting of the
learning/acquisition distinction does not seem compatible with the distinction as drawn
by Krashen.
Conclusion
The distinction between acquisition and learning can be supported if language
acquisition truly is qualitatively different from other kinds of learning and relies on a
LAD which operates outside the realm of awareness.  However, even if this is true,
acquisition without awareness would only seem to account for the acquisition of aspects
of language which fall within the scope of UG or which can be acted upon by the LAD.
Other aspects of a language would have to be learned by domain-general learning
mechanisms.  At least some parts of each of the different domain-general learning
mechanisms proposed in the field of cognitive psychology, including mechanisms for
implicit learning, involve awareness.  Therefore, when it comes to the acquisition of these
other aspects, the acquisition/learning distinction cannot supported without recourse to
subliminal learning, the existence of which is unsupported by evidence from cognitive
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psychology.  If SLA (or even first language acquisition) is not different from other kinds
of learning, as argued by Anderson (1983, 1993) and Reber (1989), and does not rely on
a special LAD, then the acquisition of any aspect of language in the complete absence of
awareness cannot be supported.
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Chapter Two
Effects of Instruction Studies and Learner-Internal Processes
Introduction
There have been a large number of experimental studies published over the last
decade looking at the effects of different kinds of instruction on SLA.  While providing
useful, if sometimes contradictory, information about the efficacy of different kinds of
instruction, such effects of instruction studies do not always provide insight into learner-
internal processes such as learner awareness or learner behavior in responding to the
instruction.  This chapter discusses what these studies can and cannot tell us about learner
awareness and behavior, why learner awareness and behavior are important, and what
needs to be done in a study in order to gain insight into these learner-internal processes.
Effects of Instruction Studies
As can be seen from Table 2.1, this decade has seen a rather large number of
effects of instruction studies.  This table contains information from 32 experimental
studies published between 1991 and 1998, and even this is by no means comprehensive.
The table is included here in order to illustrate some recent trends in the design of
experimental studies of SLA.
